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Conviction Without Conviction 
Talia Fisher† 
INTRODUCTION 
Under Romano-Canon law and, later, under medieval Eng-
lish and Continental law, “full proof” requirements for serious 
crimes entailed the incriminating testimony of at least two wit-
nesses.1 However, the testimony of one witness or the testimo-
ny of two witnesses who were insufficiently credible could 
amount to “half proof,” which justified the imposition of a leni-
ent sanction.2 Partial certainty of guilt resulted in partial pun-
ishment, reflecting what Michel Foucault termed the “continu-
ous gradation” principle: 
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Hannes, Alon Harel, Sheila Jasanoff, Roy Kreitner, Shai Lavi, Ariel Porat, 
David Sklansky, Alex Stein, and Avi Tabbach. I would also like to thank the 
participants of the STS forum at Harvard Kennedy School for their important 
insights. I am very grateful to Jessica Ems, who provided outstanding editori-
al assistance. Copyright © 2012 by Talia Fisher. 
 1. See Charles L. Barzun, Rules of Weight, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957, 
1964 (2008) (“The number of witnesses required to prove various acts varied, 
but for many crimes, such as murder, the testimony of at least two witnesses 
was required for the ‘full proof ’ necessary to sustain a conviction.”); Barbara J. 
Shapiro, “Fact” and the Proof of Fact in Anglo-American Law, in HOW LAW 
KNOWS 25, 30 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007) (describing the sources of the 
two-witnesses requirement and its adoption by various systems of law); John 
H. Wigmore, Required Numbers of Witnesses; A Brief History of the Numerical 
System in England, 15 HARV. L. REV. 83, 84 (1901) (describing the two-
witnesses prerequisite in Roman law, early English law, and Continental civil 
law). The “full proof” requirement could also be fulfilled when the accused con-
fessed to the alleged crime.  
 2. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND 
ENGLAND IN THE ANCIENT REGIME 47 (1977) (describing the development of 
the system of full-proof and half-proof and discussing the practice of 
Verdachtsstrafe, “punishment for suspicion,” partial punishment upon the 
court’s belief in a defendant’s guilt without full Romano-Canonical proof ). 
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Guilt did not begin when all the evidence was gathered together; 
piece by piece, it was constituted by each of the elements that made it 
possible to recognize a guilty person. Thus a semi-proof did not leave 
the suspect innocent until such time as it was completed; it made him 
semi-guilty; slight evidence of a serious crime marked someone as 
slightly criminal. In short, penal demonstration did not obey a dualis-
tic system: true or false; but a principle of continuous gradation; a de-
gree reached in the demonstration already formed a degree of guilt 
and consequently involved a degree of punishment.3 
Unlike the linear (continuous gradation) conceptualization 
of criminal guilt and punishment in the ancient juridical 
worlds, today’s criminal judgments are construed in a binary 
manner.4 The decision-making processes underlying the deter-
mination of guilt and punishment in criminal trials are cur-
rently governed by what will hereinafter be termed the 
“threshold model.” The threshold model construes conviction as 
an on-off decision, leading to all-or-nothing sentencing. Accord-
ing to this decision-making structure, when the incriminating 
evidence fails to cross the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt threshold, 
the defendant must be categorically acquitted.5 The court can-
 
 3. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 42 (Alan Sheridan trans., 
Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995); see also EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 84 (expanded 
ed. 1996) (claiming that in the Romano-Canonical systems of the ancient 
world, it took evidence to acquit as well as to convict, and when evidence for ei-
ther was lacking, the imposition of partial punishments filled the epistemic gap). 
 4. See Samuel Bray, Not Proven: Introducing a Third Verdict, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1299, 1308 (2005) (analyzing the binary nature of the criminal verdict). 
 5. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the due 
process clause prohibits the conviction of a defendant except upon proof be-
yond-a-reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which he is charged. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In re 
Winship was a juvenile delinquency case, in which the defendant was found 
guilty of what would have constituted a criminal act for an adult, by the pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof then required by New York law. 
Id. at 360. The judge conceded that under a “beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard” the verdict might have been different. Id. Following his conviction, 
the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard. Id. The New York appellate courts affirmed the constitu-
tionality of the law. Id. This United States Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that in criminal cases, proof of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt” was a consti-
tutional requirement of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 364; see also United 
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509–11 (1995) (noting that Constitution give a 
criminal defendant the right to demand a jury find him guilty of all elements 
of a crime); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979) (extending the con-
stitutional requirement of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to appel-
late review).  
The standard applies both with respect to misdemeanors and to felonies, 
at all degrees of offense, and even when the case is tried without a jury. See, 
e.g., United States v. Collazo, 117 F.3d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Randolph, 93 F.3d 656, 660 (9th Cir. 1996). For a discussion of the origins of 
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not choose to convict the defendant to a lesser degree or express 
its epistemic doubt in the mitigation of the sentence. Satisfac-
tion of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard leads to the po-
lar opposite result—of categorical conviction—and to the impo-
sition of punishment whose severity is detached from the 
degree of persuasion as to the defendant’s guilt.6 Under the 
threshold model, once the defendant is found guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, any residual doubt as to the defendant’s cul-
pability is not included among the sentencing considerations 
and does not affect sentence severity.7 The prevailing threshold 
model facilitates an all-or-nothing sentencing regime, where no 
punishment is imposed in the epistemic space below the be-
yond-a-reasonable-doubt threshold, while from that point up-
wards the severity of punishment is fixed in that it is discon-
nected from the weight of the evidence regarding culpability.  
The threshold model, with its categorical formulation of 
criminal conviction and all-or-nothing sentencing configuration, 
has been established to the point of being considered axiomatic. 
The purpose of this Article is to call into question the inevita-
bility of the threshold model. More specifically, this Article re-
assesses the idea of guilt as a purely binary phenomenon that 
is limited to an on-off configuration (either guilty or not guilty). 
It will also reconsider the derivative distribution of punish-
ment, whereby no punishment is imposed in the epistemic 
space below the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt threshold, while 
from that threshold upwards the severity of punishment is dis-
connected from any remaining doubt as to guilt.  
 
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt constitutional requirement, see Dale A. Nance, 
Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 647, 656–68 
(1994). For an elaborate historical account, see generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, 
THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL 
TRIAL (2008) (claiming that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt rule is not an epis-
temological rule but a moral rule, which was aimed at defending the morality 
of the jurors who sit in judgment); see also BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, “BEYOND 
REASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE”: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE (1991) (exploring legal standards of 
proof in western law). 
 6. See Elizabeth R. Jungman, Beyond All Doubt, 91 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1089 
(2003) (claiming that all questions of guilt are understood to be resolved at the 
conviction phase of trial).  
 7. The severity of the criminal sanction is supposed to be based solely on 
variables relating either to the gravity of the particular offense or to the char-
acteristics of the convicted defendant herself. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Convic-
tion Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1179 (1993) (claiming that the sen-
tencing guidelines are infused with considerations relating to the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime).  
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The threshold model will be evaluated by contrasting it 
with the alternative regime of “probabilistic decision making.” 
Under the probabilistic model, criminal guilt and punishment 
are construed in a linear manner: a plurality of conviction op-
tions exists along the evidentiary spectrum and punishment 
gravity is correlated with certainty of guilt. From a practical 
standpoint, this means a decision regime that recognizes differ-
ent classes of convictions, including intermediate categories, 
such as conviction on guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, convic-
tion on guilt by clear and convincing evidence, or conviction by 
preponderance of the evidence. Punishment severity is adjusted 
to the corresponding conviction category. For example, for a 
given offense, conviction on guilt beyond all residual doubt 
would yield maximal punishment (capital punishment, for in-
stance), whereas conviction on guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
would render near-maximal sanctions (allowing for life impris-
onment but precluding capital punishment). Conviction by 
clear and convincing evidence for the same crime would lead to 
an intermediate level of punishment (less than a life sentence), 
while conviction on guilt by a preponderance of the evidence 
would entail only the lowest of the possible sanction alterna-
tives (such as a fine).8  
 
 8. Of course, implementing a probabilistic regime would likely open the 
door to a continuous spectrum of intermediate convictions of exact statistical 
rates with corresponding degrees of punishment, such as, conviction at an 86 
percent degree of certainty or 73 percent degree of certainty. However, in prac-
tice, the spectrum of choice can be expected to be more limited, for in typical 
cases, the court lacks the tools and information necessary for making an exact 
calculation of the probability of guilt. Consequently, the court draws its con-
clusions from categorical generalizations, making the judicial decision a crude 
assessment that is not amenable to precise statistical quantification. Irrespec-
tive of the practical hurdles, there are those who object in principle to turning 
the judicial decision into a precise statistical determination, as I will discuss 
further on in this article.  
See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the expressive component of 
Charles R. Nesson’s criticism. Nesson expressed the opinion that an exact 
quantification of the reasonable-doubt standard would impair its functional 
purpose, which is subjective in nature. See Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable 
Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
1187, 1197 (1979); see also A.A.S. ZUCKERMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL 
EVIDENCE 132 (1989) (noting that people almost never have sufficient data to 
make precise measures of guilt); Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of 
Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 
105, 125–26 (1999) (noting that instructions focusing on doubt increase convic-
tion rates); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in 
the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1372 (1971) (noting problems with 
quantifying guilt).  
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The probabilistic model poses both a descriptive and a 
normative challenge to the threshold model. On the descriptive 
front I will claim that, contrary to common wisdom and to the 
theoretical understanding of decision making in the criminal 
arena, closer scrutiny reveals that central criminal law doc-
trines effectively deviate from the threshold model and exhibit 
the logic of the probabilistic model. The residual-doubt doc-
trine, the recidivist premium, and the jury trial penalty have 
established a de facto correlation between certainty of guilt and 
severity of punishment, infusing the criminal trial realm with 
probabilistic logic. In light of these instances of probabilistic 
decision-making, which have already taken root in the criminal 
arena, there is room to contest the inexorableness of the 
threshold model. 
On the normative plane, this Article raises some of the 
principal arguments in favor of a linear conceptualization of 
criminal conviction and point to the utilitarian, expressive, re-
tributivist, and political legitimacy bases for probabilistic sen-
tencing. This Article shows that a sliding scale punishment, 
correlated with the certainty of guilt, is preferable to uniform 
punishment in the epistemic space above the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt threshold. It also demonstrates that when the 
level of certainty as to the defendant’s guilt does not meet the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof, conviction under 
a lower evidentiary standard and the imposition of partial pun-
ishment, reflecting the epistemic doubt, can also lead—in cer-
tain circumstances—to better outcomes than the existing alter-
native of acquittal without punishment. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I will discuss prevail-
ing criminal law doctrines and practices that express probabil-
istic decision making logic. Part II will briefly present the de-
terrence-based case for probabilistic sentencing. Part III will 
contend with the expressive dimensions of probabilistic deci-
sion making in criminal trials. Part IV will elucidate the re-
 
Supporting the normative difficulties in making a precise statistical quan-
tification of judicial decisions is the fact that even “reasonable doubt” remains 
vague from a statistical perspective. Solan, supra at 126. Indeed, courts have 
systematically objected to a statistical quantification of this evidence stand-
ard. See, e.g., State v. Cruz, 639 A.2d 534, 537–38 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994). It 
should be noted from a practical perspective that the majority of judges sur-
veyed in one empirical study assessed the reasonable-doubt standard of proof 
as standing at 90 percent. Solan, supra at 126. Regardless, under a probabilis-
tic punishment regime, judges can be expected to resort to general evidence 
standards that have already been recognized in the case-law, such as the pre-
ponderance-of-evidence or clear-and-convincing-evidence standards of proof. 
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tributivist and mixed retributivist-utilitarian considerations re-
lating to the probabilistic model. Part V will examine the prob-
abilistic model from a political legitimacy perspective. The final 
Part will offer concluding remarks. 
I.  PROBABILISTIC DECISION-MAKING UNDER 
PREVAILING LAW   
Probabilistic decision making in criminal law is not just 
part of a distant past. Closer scrutiny reveals that central doc-
trines and practices, currently prevailing in the area of crimi-
nal law, exhibit the logic of probabilistic decision making. Some 
of these doctrines, such as residual doubt, create a direct and 
explicit correlativity between certainty of guilt and severity of 
punishment. Other legal practices, such as the recidivist sen-
tencing premium or jury trial penalty, forge an indirect reci-
procity. In this Part, I survey a number of the prevailing crimi-
nal law doctrines that embody probabilistic decision-making 
logic. I also offer preliminary support for the claim that regard-
less of the formal legal regime, decisions regarding sentence se-
verity are effectively influenced by the extent of certainty re-
garding the defendant’s guilt. 
A. THE RESIDUAL DOUBT DOCTRINE 
Residual doubt relates to the epistemic space that stretch-
es between the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof 
and the point of absolute certainty.9 It creates a correlation be-
tween gravity of punishment and certainty of guilt when it acts 
as a mitigating factor—namely, “when juries decide not to im-
pose a death sentence because they are not absolutely certain of 
the defendant’s guilt.”10 To explain in brief, the fact that the ju-
ry was persuaded of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt does not—in and of itself—preclude any remaining doubt 
as to culpability.11 Even if such epistemic uncertainties do not 
 
 9. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 188 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (describing residual doubt as “a lingering uncertainty about facts, a state 
of mind that exists somewhere between ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ and ‘abso-
lute certainty’”). 
 10. Christina S. Pignatelli, Residual Doubt: It’s a Life Saver, 13 CAP. DEF. 
J. 307, 314 (2001). 
 11. See Margery Malkin Koosed, Averting Mistaken Executions by Adopt-
ing the Model Penal Code’s Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering 
Doubt, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 55 (2001) (defining residual doubt as “doubt 
that is experienced, discussed, and ultimately remains, though it does not 
yield an acquittal of the crime or a negative finding as to the aggravating fac-
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amount to reasonable doubt, they cannot be completely dis-
missed.12 Under prevailing law, the existence of residual doubt 
as to a defendant’s guilt in a capital offense could, in some cas-
es, constitute a (non statutory) consideration for commuting the 
death sentence to life imprisonment.13 Federal courts applied 
the doctrine sweepingly until it was redefined by the Supreme 
Court in Franklin v. Lynaugh,14 where the Court held that a de-
fendant does not have a constitutional right to have the judge 
instruct the jury that it should consider residual doubt about 
guilt in its sentencing decision.15 The Franklin ruling did not 
 
tor. It may not be a ‘reasonable doubt’ but it is a real doubt nonetheless”); 
Pignatelli, supra note 10, at 308 (defining residual doubt as “(1) actual, rea-
sonable doubt about guilt of any crime; (2) actual, reasonable doubt that de-
fendant was guilty of a capital offense, as opposed to other offenses; (3) a small 
degree of doubt about (1) or (2), sufficient to cause the juror not to want to 
foreclose (by execution) the possibility that new evidence might appear in the 
future”). 
 12. As the Fifth Circuit said, 
The fact that jurors have determined guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
does not necessarily mean that no juror entertained any doubt what-
soever. There may be no reasonable doubt—doubt based on reason—
and yet some genuine doubt exists. It may reflect a mere possibility; it 
may be but the whimsy of one juror or several. Yet this whimsical 
doubt—this absence of absolute certainty—can be real. 
Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 13. See Jennifer R. Treadway, Note, “Residual Doubt” in Capital Sentenc-
ing: No Doubt It Is an Appropriate Mitigating Factor, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
215, 215–28 (1992) (examining the treatment of the residual doubt doctrine by 
the Supreme Court and by the different states). Justice Thurgood Marshall 
has commented on the justification of the residual doubt doctrine: 
[O]ne of the most fearful aspects of the death penalty is its finali-
ty . . . . The belief that such an ultimate and final penalty is inappro-
priate where there are doubts as to guilt, even if they do not rise to 
the level necessary for acquittal, is a feeling that stems from common 
sense and fundamental notions of justice. 
Heiney v. Florida, 469 U.S. 920, 921–22 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari).  
 14. 487 U.S. 164, 183 (1988) (rejecting the petitioner’s claim that the trial 
court’s jury instructions—which did not inform the jury of the possibility of 
commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment due to residual doubt—
were in violation of the Constitution). For further description of Franklin v. 
Lynaugh, see Jungman, supra note 6, at 1087. 
 15. 487 U.S. at 175; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 320 (1989), 
abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) 
(characterizing Franklin v. Lynaugh as a case in which the majority agreed 
that “residual doubt” is not a constitutionally mandated mitigating factor). 
Moreover, it arises from the majority opinion in Franklin that even if it were 
within the ambit of constitutionally protected mitigating factors, there still is 
no corresponding right to jury instruction. See 487 U.S. at 174–75 (noting that 
the particular defendant had not been deprived of any constitutional right, as 
 840 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:833 
 
address the broader and more fundamental question of wheth-
er, aside from the ensuing jury instructions, residual doubt re-
garding guilt can serve as a mitigating factor in sentencing. In 
its 2006 Oregon v. Guzek decision, the Supreme Court reiterat-
ed its ruling in Franklin, holding that a judge is not obligated 
to direct the jury with regard to the residual doubt doctrine, 
but that this does not preclude evidence regarding residual 
doubt from being presented and the jury from considering it.16 
The question regarding the defendant’s right to present evi-
dence of residual doubt to the jury was also deliberated in 
United States v. Davis, where it was held that in the federal le-
gal system, defendants are permitted to raise a residual doubt 
claim at their sentencing hearing.17 Moreover, the court held 
that when the defense makes such a claim, the jury is required 
to weigh it in determining the sentence.18  
At the state level, there is great variance among the differ-
ent jurisdictions on the issue of inclusion of residual doubt in 
the category of mitigating circumstances,19 for Franklin left it 
for each state to decide as to the application of the doctrine in 
its justice system.20 Some states, such as New Jersey, require 
both oral and written presentation of the residual doubt doc-
trine before the jury at the sentencing hearing.21 In Tennessee, 
the defendant’s attorney has the option of bringing a residual 
doubt claim before the jury.22 By contrast, in Florida, the doc-
trine is not recognized and defendants are precluded from rais-
ing residual doubt as a mitigating factor in sentencing.23 In 
 
the trial court had not prevented the defendant or his counsel from presenting 
the residual doubt doctrine before the jury).  
 16. 546 U.S. 517, 525–26 (2006).  
 17. 132 F. Supp. 2d 455, 468 (E.D. La. 2001) (holding that in the federal 
system, defendants are permitted to raise residual doubt arguments under 18 
U.S.C. § 3592 (2006). 
 18. Id. (ruling that residual doubt arguments must be considered by the 
jury if raised by the defense). 
 19. See Louis D. Bilonis, Legitimating Death, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1643, 1695 
(1993) (surveying the different approaches state systems have adopted on the 
issue of residual doubt). 
 20. Franklin, 487 U.S. at 173; see also Treadway, supra note 13, at 222 
n.58 (claiming that this approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s gen-
eral unwillingness to impose constitutional controls with respect to the proce-
dures that states use in their criminal justice systems).  
 21. See State v. Biegenwald, 594 A.2d 172, 197 (N.J. 1991) (“Jurors must 
be permitted to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence.”). 
 22. See State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 55 (Tenn. 2001).  
 23. See King v. State, 514 So. 2d 354, 358 (Fla. 1987); see also Jungman, 
supra note 6, at 1088. 
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Virginia, too, the doctrine is not applied.24 The Virginia Su-
preme Court held in Stockton v. Commonwealth that defend-
ants are not entitled to challenge a determination of criminal 
liability at the sentencing hearing, for the issue of guilt has al-
ready been resolved in the first stage of trial.25 In Atkins v. 
Commonwealth, the defendant contested the bifurcated deci-
sion-making system per se, claiming that it violates his consti-
tutional rights in preventing him from arguing residual doubt 
as to his guilt at sentencing.26 The Virginia Supreme Court re-
jected this claim, holding that defendants cannot make residual 
doubt claims at sentencing.27  
These formal legal regimes notwithstanding, the prevailing 
practice that has emerged among juries is to mitigate the pun-
ishment and impose life imprisonment, rather than the death 
penalty, when there are residual doubts as to a defendant’s 
guilt.28  
How the law treats the issue of a jury’s consideration of residual 
doubt is one thing . . . but how juries treat it is reasonably clear. Vari-
ous studies have concluded that residual doubt about guilt is the sin-
gle most persuasive aspect of a case leading to the imposition of a life 
sentence.29 
For jurors, then, residual doubt has become a de facto mit-
igating factor, including in those states where the doctrine does 
not apply de jure.30 For example, in Florida, 69 percent of jurors 
 
 24. See Pignatelli, supra note 10, at 312 (“While some states have given 
residual doubt a prominent role in their sentencing schemes, Virginia has de-
clined to do so.”). 
 25. 402 S.E.2d 196, 207 (Va. 1991); see also Frye v. Commonwealth, 345 
S.E.2d 267, 283 (Va. 1986) (ruling that the defendant was not entitled to chal-
lenge the determination regarding his criminal responsibility at the sentenc-
ing hearing, for “the issue of guilt had been resolved in the first phase of the 
trial and could not properly be raised again in the penalty phase”). 
 26. 534 S.E.2d 312, 314 (Va. 2000). 
 27. Id. at 315. 
 28. See Treadway, supra note 13, at 231–32 (noting that residual doubt 
acts as a de facto mitigating factor). 
 29. Bruce A. Antkowiak, Judicial Nullification, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
545, 582 (2005). 
 30. See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of 
Worthy and Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343, 371 (2003) (suggest-
ing that juries are impacted by their impression from the guilt stage of the tri-
al at sentencing even without the formal application of the residual doubt doc-
trine); see also Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital 
Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1563 (1998) (“[T]he 
best thing a capital defendant can do to improve his chances of receiving a life 
sentence . . . is to raise doubt about his guilt.”); Susan D. Rozelle, The Princi-
pled Executioner: Capital Juries’ Bias and the Benefits of True Bifurcation, 38 
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who had decided on a life sentence admitted in retrospect that 
their choice of the reduced penalty had stemmed from residual 
doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.31 A similar pattern is appar-
ent amongst jurors in Virginia, where the residual doubt doc-
trine also does not officially apply.32 In a comprehensive study 
that examined 600 homicide cases in Georgia on a variety of 
parameters, it was found that residual doubt about guilt effec-
tively influenced the severity of the penalty imposed and led to 
the commuting of death sentences to life sentences.33  
In sum, juries over the years have integrated uncertainty 
regarding guilt into their sentencing calculations, turning re-
sidual doubt into a central mitigating factor for conversion of 
death sentences to life imprisonment.34 The residual doubt doc-
trine can, thus, be construed as an instance of probabilistic de-
cision making: On the sentencing plane, it facilitates correlativ-
ity between punishment severity and certainty of guilt. On the 
culpability level, it leads to the effective fragmentation of the 
category of conviction into two (informal) sub-categories of con-
viction on guilt beyond residual doubt and conviction on guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. THE RECIDIVIST SENTENCING PREMIUM 
Enhancement of sentences due to recidivism is another ex-
ample of how probabilistic logic has infiltrated criminal pro-
ceedings. Repeat offenders are punished more harshly than 
first-time offenders.35 In fact, a defendant’s criminal record 
 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 775 (2006) (“Residual doubt, or the jurors’ lingering fear 
that the defendant may not be guilty after all, is the most potent mitigator in 
capital cases . . . .”).  
 31. William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or 
Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 1, 28 (1988) (interviewing and examining jury members from capital trials 
in Florida). 
 32. See Pignatelli, supra note 10 (“[C]omments by capital case jurors in 
Virginia indicate that despite Virginia’s prohibition on argument about resid-
ual doubt at sentencing, their own residual doubt impacted their decision to 
recommend a life sentence.”).  
 33. See Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death 
Sentence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1327, 1343 (1985).  
 34. See Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: 
The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 357 n.236 (claiming 
that residual doubt about a defendant’s guilt is a major factor in a jury’s deci-
sion to impose life sentences and may even amount to the “strongest possible 
mitigating evidence”).  
 35. See C.Y. Cyrus Chu et al., Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely, 
20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127, 127 (2000) (arguing that punishing repeat of-
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(alongside offense severity) is the weightiest determinative fac-
tor in sentence gravity.36 The imposition of a “recidivist premi-
um” is entrenched in formal legal doctrine on the federal, state, 
and administrative levels.37 The federal sentencing guidelines, 
for instance, use two sets of numerical scores to determine a 
convicted offender’s sentence: offense level, which represents 
the seriousness of the crime, and criminal history. Under these 
guidelines, the richer an offender’s criminal record, the more 
determinative its effect on the applicable range of punishment 
for the most recent offense.38 State guidelines likewise incorpo-
rate recidivist provisions.39 Noteworthy examples of recidivism-
based penalty escalation statutes include the “Three-Strikes-
and-You’re-Out” laws adopted by various state jurisdictions.40 
Courts—both state and federal—have also effectively endorsed 
the policy of recidivist premiums. There are unequivocal indica-
tions that first-time offenders receive lighter sentences than 
repeat offenders, and that offenders with a long history of crim-
inality are more severely punished than those with few prior 
 
fenders more harshly than first-time offenders is a generally accepted practice 
and characteristic of the vast majority of penal codes and sentencing guide-
lines); see also Moshe Burnovski & Zvi Safra, Deterrence Effects of Sequential 
Punishment Policies: Should Repeat Offenders Be More Severely Punished?, 14 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 341, 341 (1994); Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal 
Record in the Sentencing Process, 22 CRIME & JUST. 303, 342 (1997).  
 36. Youngjae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account, 87 TEX. 
L. REV. 571, 571 (2009) (“In the United States, the most important determi-
nant of punishment for a crime, other than the seriousness of the crime itself, 
is the offender’s criminal history.”). 
 37. David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Re-
peat Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 735 (2001) (“The principle is embedded in 
formal federal, state, and administrative codes . . . .”). 
 38. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A (2010); see also 
Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentenc-
ing, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 572 (2008); Michael Edmund O’Neill, Abraham’s 
Legacy: An Empirical Assessment of (Nearly) First-Time Offenders in the Fed-
eral System, 42 B.C. L. REV. 291, 305–06 (2001). 
 39. Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State 
Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 434 (2000) (“[N]ewer guide-
lines systems are likely to incorporate recidivist and ‘dangerous offender’ pro-
visions . . . .”). 
 40. John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing Follow-
ing Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. REV. 235, 
245 n.27 (2006) (specifying the twenty-five jurisdictions to adopt a three-
strikes policy). For a survey of three-strikes laws, see Marc Mauer, Why Are 
Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 9 (1999). For a 
more elaborate discussion of recidivist statutes, see 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habitual 
Criminals §§ 1–55 (2008). 
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convictions.41 In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
recidivist premiums do not violate the double jeopardy prohibi-
tion.42 Complementing the formal legal doctrine and case law 
are prosecutors’ enforcement norms that also embrace the no-
tion of increased sentences for recidivists.43 The principle of en-
hancement for re-offenders has become so broadly accepted and 
popular “that it strikes most people as simple common sense.”44 
This widespread practical acceptance of recidivist premi-
ums, notwithstanding the question of whether an offender’s 
criminal history ought to affect her penalty for a current of-
fense, has been the subject of heated theoretical debate dating 
back to Plato.45 Utilitarian justifications for the recidivist pre-
mium include deterrence considerations that “dictate[] that a 
clear message be sent to society that repeated criminal behav-
ior will aggravate the need for punishment with each recur-
rence.”46 It has been suggested in this context that individuals 
who have been convicted of one crime need enhanced penalties 
to be optimally deterred from re-offending, for by engaging in 
criminal behavior in the past, such individuals have revealed 
their proclivity for criminal activity.47 Moreover, one must bear 
in mind that when offenders have been subjected to prior crim-
inal punishment, the formal sanction is eroded, resulting in a 
weaker deterrent effect than for first-time offenders. Individu-
als with criminal records have lower opportunity costs; the 
marginal cost of the first years behind bars is lower than the 
marginal cost of subsequent imprisonment years, and the addi-
tional reputation costs entailed in a greater number of convic-
 
 41. Dana, supra note 37. 
 42. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995) (holding use of a pre-
vious offense in the sentencing of a current offense does not constitute a dou-
ble jeopardy violation). 
 43. Dana, supra note 37 (claiming that the principle of increased penalties 
due to recidivism has become an enforcement norm “of prosecutors and gov-
ernment officials at all levels of government”); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell, On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence, 18 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 305, 305 (1998) (“[T]he law often sanctions repeat offenders more 
severely than first-time offenders.”). 
 44. Dana, supra note 37. 
 45. O’Neill, supra note 38, at 296 (arguing that the preoccupation with a 
defendant’s criminal past has extensive theoretical foundations that can be 
traced back to Aristotle and Plato).  
 46. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 38. 
 47. Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 
35 CONN. L. REV. 1321, 1338 (2003) (“[T]hose who have previously committed 
crimes have revealed a preference for criminal activity . . . .”); see also Lee, su-
pra note 36, at 573. 
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tions decrease as the number of convictions rises.48 From a re-
habilitation perspective, prior convictions are considered an 
important proxy for low rehabilitative potential.49 Other conse-
quentialist rationales for the recidivist doctrine relate to the 
need to preserve public trust in the justice system and to the 
damage that may result from the “revolving door” phenomenon, 
where offenders repeatedly exit and reenter jail in short peri-
ods of time.50 Retributivists have traditionally been more criti-
cal of sentencing enhancement based on prior convictions, their 
common objection being that the punishment should fit the 
current crime and not past behavior.51 However, even propo-
nents of just desert have defended recidivist doctrines on the 
grounds that the moral culpability of past offenders is graver in 
light of their prior acts, for which they were punished and from 
which they failed to learn. Indeed, Andrew von Hirsch main-
tains that the later sentences can bring to bear the full weight 
of the law because the offender has been forewarned of the ille-
gitimacy of his behavior (by way of the previous sentence).52  
It is my contention that alongside these various rationales, 
the recidivist premium can also be construed as a manifesta-
tion of the link between certainty of guilt and severity of pun-
ishment. There could be room to claim that the additional in-
formation submitted post-conviction—regarding the 
defendant’s prior convictions—updates and increases the like-
lihood of her involvement in the latest alleged offense. For ex-
ample, statistics show that a person who has committed past 
offenses is more likely to be involved in subsequent criminal ac-
tivity.53 Submission of information regarding past convictions 
 
 48. Strandburg, supra note 47 (“[T]he additional stigma due to additional 
convictions for similar offenses surely decreases rapidly as the number of con-
victions rises.”). 
 49. JULIAN V. ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS: EXPLORING 
COMMUNITY AND OFFENDER PERSPECTIVES 35–36 (2008) (discussing the sig-
nificance of recidivism for estimating rehabilitation capacity). 
 50. See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Unprincipled Punishment of Repeat Of-
fenders: A Critique of California’s Habitual Criminal Statute, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
193, 194 (1990) (terming this phenomenon “revolving door justice”). 
 51. See Lee, supra note 36, at 575 (describing the argument that the se-
verity of a crime is unrelated to the offender’s personal criminal history). 
 52. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 
85 (1976). 
 53. See Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Aggregating Probabilities Across Cases: 
Criminal Responsibility for Unspecified Offenses, 94 MINN. L. REV. 261, 280 
(2009) (“It is the interdependence between the past offense and the present 
alleged offense that provides the grounds for conviction.”); see also A. Rubin-
stein, An Optimal Conviction Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Commit-
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thus reinforces the first-stage convicting verdict and pushes the 
probability of guilt, which has already crossed the reasonable 
doubt threshold (as inferred from the fact of conviction) to a 
point that comes even closer to absolute certainty. The recidi-
vist premium both reflects and is a consequence of the greater 
certainty level regarding a repeat offender’s guilt and involve-
ment in the current offense. This also explains why the recidi-
vist premium for offenders with numerous prior convictions is 
more substantial than that imposed on repeat offenders with a 
more modest criminal record: the richer a convicted defendant’s 
criminal record, the greater the added certainty of her culpabil-
ity in the most recent offense. To conclude, recidivism doctrines 
can be understood as an expression of probabilistic decision 
making in criminal trials. On the sentencing plane, the recidi-
vist premium is a context in which severity of punishment is 
enhanced to correlate with updated probability of guilt. On the 
conviction plane, the updating process effectively institutes an-
other category of conviction in the epistemic space above the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt threshold—one that is in greater 
proximity to the endpoint of absolute certainty. 
C. THE JURY TRIAL PENALTY 
The imposition of harsher sentences on convicted defend-
ants who chose to assert their constitutionally protected proce-
dural rights—most notably, the right to trial by jury—has be-
come routine practice in many American courtrooms.54 Data 
collected nationwide over the past four decades indicate that 
when the offense-type variable is constant, bench trial sentenc-
es are, on average, more lenient than jury trial sentences.55 
 
ted by Accident, APPLIED GAME THEORY 406, 407 (1979) (arguing that in a re-
peat game scenario, the most just outcome is reached by being lenient to of-
fenders with a light criminal record but being harsh to repeat offenders). For 
an empirical examination of the link between exposure to information of prior 
convictions and probability of conviction on current charges, see Theodore Ei-
senberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of 
a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes 30 
(Cornell Legal Studies Research Article No. 07-012, Aug. 8, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=998529. 
 54. Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in 
Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines 
States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 962–63 (2005) (claiming that the practice of 
exchanging punishment concessions for waiver of procedural safeguards is 
widespread in the United States and elsewhere). 
 55. See, e.g., id. at 962 n.7 (surveying the literature on the trial penalty 
phenomenon); Gary D. LaFree, Adversarial and Nonadversarial Justice: A 
Comparison of Guilty Pleas and Trials, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 289, 300 (1985) 
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This discrepancy would imply that courts impose a “jury trial 
penalty” on defendants who invoke their right to a full jury tri-
al.56 The most prevalent justification for this phenomenon is 
that it is intended to provide defendants with an incentive to 
waive expensive procedural safeguards, so as to reduce the 
costs entailed in the administration of criminal justice.57 An-
other justification for the jury trial penalty, most particularly 
imposed on those defendants who plead not guilty, relates to 
the lack of remorse that the insistence on innocence expresses.58 
Other explanations point to the greater public scrutiny of jury 
trials, which may discourage elected trial judges from imposing 
lenient sentences in such cases.59 
These considerations notwithstanding, it can also be ar-
gued that the imposition of higher sentences in jury trials can 
be understood as an expression of the link between certainty of 
guilt and severity of punishment. The decision of twelve jurors 
to convict may embody a greater measure of certainty as to the 
defendant’s guilt than the verdict of a lone judge. Not only is a 
 
(showing sentence discrepancies between jury and bench trials across state 
courts); Lawrence P. Tiffany et al., A Statistical Analysis of Sentencing in Fed-
eral Courts: Defendants Convicted After Trial 1967–1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 
369, 379 (1975) (demonstrating that conviction by jury leads to more severe 
sentences than bench trial conviction); Thomas M. Uhlman & N. Darlene 
Walker, “He Takes Some of My Time; I Take Some of His”: An Analysis of Ju-
dicial Sentencing Patterns in Jury Cases, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 323, 335 (1980) 
(finding jury trial sentences harsher than bench trial sentences); Jeffery T. 
Ulmer & Mindy S. Bradley, Variation in Trial Penalties Among Serious Vio-
lent Offenses, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 631, 653–54 (2006). 
 56. See DAVID W. NEUBAUER, AMERICA’S COURTS & THE CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM 287 (1988) (claiming that the penalty reflects the philosophy that 
the defendant must “pay” for taking up the jury’s time); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1062–63 (1984) (argu-
ing that defendants waive procedural rights for leniency in punishment); 
Thomas Weigend, Is the Criminal Process About Truth?: A German Perspec-
tive, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 157, 167 (2003) (arguing that “defendants pay 
a heavy price for the ‘second bite’ of a jury trial if they are convicted”). For fur-
ther discussion of the size of the penalty, see Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distor-
tion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
79, 113 n.96 (2005) (noting that a guilty plea can sometimes cut a defendant’s 
sentence in half ). 
 57. King et al., supra note 54, at 964 (describing the efficiency rationale 
for the trial penalty and quoting one judge’s famous remark in this regard: 
“He takes some of my time, I take some of his”).  
 58. Id. at 963 n.12.  
 59. Id. at 964 (“[P]ublic scrutiny of sentences may be highest in cases that 
go to jury trial. This may contribute to the reluctance of elected trial judges 
and prosecutors to select and recommend lenient sentences after a jury has 
returned a guilty verdict.”).  
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jury conviction based on the prosecution’s ability to convince a 
greater number of fact-finders that the defendant is guilty as 
charged, but juries, it has been asserted, tend to a priori favor 
the defense on issues of reasonable doubt.60 As Schulhofer has 
stated, “a bench trial is seen as an option that reduces the 
chances for acquittal . . . .”61 It can thus be claimed that the rel-
atively higher degree of certainty as to a defendant’s guilt in 
cases where she is found guilty by a jury—as compared to 
bench trials—is another contributing factor in the discrepancy 
in sentences. The relative gravity of sentences in jury trials is 
reflective of the elevated certainty as to guilt in the wake of a 
jury verdict, whereas the relatively lenient sentences in bench 
trials are due, at least in part, to a lower degree of epistemic 
confidence in the conviction. Analogous claims can be made 
with respect to the exercise of other procedural rights, includ-
ing the right to cross examine witnesses or the right to assis-
tance of counsel.  
D. THE CRIMINAL-CIVIL INTERPLAY AND PLEA BARGAINS 
Correlativity between the certainty of guilt and the severi-
ty of punishment, as well as the fragmentation of the category 
of conviction into sub classes, can also be detected outside of 
the criminal trial arena—as exemplified by the interplay be-
tween criminal trials and civil trials and by the practice of plea 
bargaining.  
Starting with the former, as suggested to me by David 
Sklansky, the interplay between civil and criminal trials can be 
construed as another way in which our justice system accom-
modates probabilistic decision making. When a defendant is 
acquitted in criminal trial, but is then held liable in a tort suit 
on parallel grounds, the civil judgment effectively functions as 
a halfway criminal conviction—reflecting satisfaction of the 
less demanding civil standard of proof as to the involvement in 
the alleged conduct, and leading to the imposition of a partial 
sanction in the form of monetary compensation. An illuminat-
ing example of this function of the civil judgment is the O.J. 
 
 60. Schulhofer, supra note 56, at 1063 (“[D]efenders . . . believe that juries 
are often more favorable to the defense on reasonable doubt questions . . . .”). 
 61. Id. (arguing that bench trials reduce the probability of acquittal, while 
increasing the chance for leniency in sentencing); see also Weigend, supra note 
56, at 164–67 (claiming that a number of factors unrelated to actual guilt, 
such as emotion, instinct, and the lack of a written opinion can lead a jury to 
acquit a defendant when a judge would be less likely to do so). 
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Simpson case.62 Following Simpson’s acquittal in a criminal tri-
al for the murders of Ron Goldman and Nicole Brown Simpson, 
the Goldman and Brown families filed wrongful death and sur-
vival suits in civil court. On February 4, 1997, a civil jury found 
Simpson liable for the wrongful death of Ron Goldman.63 Fred 
Goldman, the victim’s father, stated repeatedly that the civil 
suit was not financially motivated, but rather that he had filed 
it so that the court would establish through the civil trial what 
the criminal trial had failed to substantiate—namely, that O.J. 
Simpson was responsible for his son’s death.64 This is also how 
the public perceived the role of the civil judgment in the O.J. 
Simpson case.65  
The practice of plea bargaining is another arena of proba-
bilistic decision making.66 Plea bargains have come to dominate 
the American criminal justice system.67 About 95 percent of in-
dividuals indicted for felony crimes in the United States resolve 
their cases by way of a guilty plea.68 Plea bargains are struck in 
 
 62. For the criminal trial, see Transcript of Delivery of Verdict, People v. 
Simpson, 1995 WL 704381 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1995) (No. BA097211). For the civil 
trial, see Amended Joint Trial Statement, Rufo v. Simpson, 1996 WL 530984 
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1996) (Nos. SC031947, SC036340, and SC036876).  
 63. Laura Hock, What’s in a Name? Fred Goldman’s Quest to Acquire O.J. 
Simpson’s Right of Publicity and the Suit’s Implications for Celebrities, 35 
PEPP. L. REV. 347, 352–53 (2008).  
 64. Allen M. Linden, Acceptance Speech: The Fleming Award 2004, 33 
PEPP. L. REV. 929, 931 (2006). 
 65. In fact, Goldman announced that he would renounce the financial 
award in the event that Simpson admits the crime. Max Bolstad, Learning 
from Japan: The Case for Increased Use of Apology in Mediation, 48 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 545, 567 (2000).  
 66. See Henrik Lando, The Size of the Sanction Should Depend on the 
Weight of the Evidence, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 277, 286 (2005) (“[L]egal systems 
that rely on plea bargaining (mainly the American) are likely to produce sanc-
tions that are weighted by the probability of conviction . . . .”). 
 67. See Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 801 
(2003) (claiming that the right to a jury trial and the right against self-
incrimination are routinely bargained away in the criminal arena, in exchange 
for sentence reduction). 
 68. Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. 
REV. 407, 409 (2008) (“[ In felony cases filed in May 2002 in the nation’s seven-
ty-five largest counties g]uilty pleas accounted for 95% of the estimated 31,772 
convictions obtained within 1 year of arrest . . . .” (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN 
COUNTIES, 2002, at 28 (2006))); see also Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched 
Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 
717, 717 (2006) (“In the criminal justice systems of the 50 states, over 95 per-
cent of all criminal cases are disposed of without a trial, through the entry of a 
guilty plea. In the federal system the percentage of bargained-for convictions 
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the shadow of the criminal trial and are reflective of the likeli-
hood of conviction in court (and of the post conviction sen-
tence).69 The likelihood of conviction, in turn, is a function of 
the strength of the prosecution’s case. In this way, plea bar-
gains calibrate sentences to the probative value of the incrimi-
nating evidence and form a link between the severities of the 
(negotiated) sentences imposed upon defendants and the level 
of proof gathered against them. Obviously, the view that plea 
bargaining is an instance of partial guilt being translated into 
partial sentencing requires a skeptical leap with regard to the 
probative weight of the confession underlying it. But, the fact 
that the courts or juries do not independently evaluate the ac-
tual evidence of the crime could be interpreted as providing the 
necessary indication that plea bargain convictions do not sub-
stantiate guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This view was also 
expressed by Albert W. Alschuler, who claimed that “[t]he plea 
bargaining system effectively substitutes a concept of partial 
guilt for the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”70  
Indeed, plea bargains are not perfect instances of probabil-
istic decision making; the correlativity between severity of pun-
ishment and probability of guilt generated by plea bargains is 
far from precise. Plea bargain outcomes are affected by a host 
of exogenous factors other than the expected outcomes at tri-
al—including agency costs, the defendant’s attitude to risk, in-
formation asymmetries between the prosecution and defense, 
the quality of legal counsel, and various cognitive biases.71 But 
 
is even higher.”).  
 69. For an elaborate description of the shadow-of-trial plea bargaining 
model, see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2465–67 (2004).  
 70. Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The 
Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1413–14 (2003). 
 71. See id. at 1413–15 (discussing how structural distortions emanating 
from agency costs, attorney competence, workloads resources, sentencing and 
bail rules, information gaps, psychological biases, and socio-economic variables 
distort plea outcomes); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market 
System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309 (discussing the effects of agency costs and 
conflicts of interest between the defendant and her attorney); Robert E. Scott 
& William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1925 
(1992) (discussing the effects of attitude toward risk). For a parallel discussion 
in the context of the civil sphere, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is 
It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some 
Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2663–71 (1995).  
Plea bargaining outcomes may deviate from the shadow of the criminal 
trial for yet another reason: the prosecution’s primary interest in reaching 
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despite the absence of a perfect correlativity between the cer-
tainty of guilt and the negotiated sentence, plea bargains, by 
and large, adjust sentencing to the level of proof regarding cul-
pability.72 Due to their prominent role,73 plea bargains have en-
trenched a sweeping regime of probabilistic decision making in 
the criminal justice system.  
Thus far, I have sought to ground the claim that a proba-
bilistic decision making model is consistent with a wide range 
of current criminal law doctrines and practices that tie severity 
of punishment to certainty of guilt and that effectively disinte-
grate the category of criminal conviction into a plurality of sub-
categories. As shown above, these probabilistic practices are 
prevalent in the framework of the criminal court, in the inter-
play between criminal and civil trials, as well as in the plea 
bargaining arena. They relate both to the epistemic space 
stretching above the reasonable doubt standard (as in the case 
of residual doubt) as well as to the space below it (as in plea 
bargaining).74 In light of the dissonance between the threshold 
ideal and the reality of the criminal justice system, there is 
room to contest the axiomatic nature of this regime. This Arti-
cle now turns to formulate the normative case for probabilistic 
decision making in criminal trials. The claim in this regard will 
be that deterrence considerations, expressive issues, and ex 
post fairness requirements support the widespread and explicit 
 
plea agreements is the reduction of enforcement costs—i.e., the “release” from 
having to continue investing resources in the gathering of more proof once the 
plea bargain has been struck. Without the plea bargain, enforcement officials 
may be induced to persist in their search for additional evidence to be present-
ed at trial, and thus the probative weight of the incriminating evidence could 
end up being greater than at the point at which the plea bargain is made. 
 72. Another reason why plea bargains are not perfect examples of proba-
bilistic decision making emanates from the fact that they are effectively struck 
outside the criminal trial arena. Although these agreements are subject to the 
court’s formal stamp of approval, from a conceptual perspective, they belong to 
the “contract world,” reflecting a contractual ordering of the criminal case. Yet, 
given that the vast majority of criminal cases are concluded in various types of 
plea bargains, the practice cannot be regarded as merely anecdotal. See 
Strandburg, supra note 47, at 1331 (describing plea bargaining as the most 
widely used method of criminal conviction).  
 73. See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal 
Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2011, 2016 (2000) (noting that “plea bargaining has long been a fixture of 
criminal adjudication in the United States”). 
 74. See Patricia M. Wald, Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Norm 
Gives Way to the Numbers, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 101, 108 (claiming that plea 
bargaining effectively lower the standard of proof ). 
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exercise of probabilistic decision making in the criminal arena, 
beyond the parameters of specific legal doctrines and practices.  
E. THE NORMATIVE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE PROBABILISTIC 
MODEL 
The question of the normative desirability of probabilistic 
decision making in the criminal arena can be understood as an 
offshoot of the proverbial tort law debate over causal appor-
tionment of liability and probabilistic recovery. John Coons’s 
1964 article challenged civil procedure’s winner-takes-all deci-
sion rule and inquired into remedy-splitting based on certainty 
of liability.75 Almost two decades passed before the issue of 
probabilistic recoveries was raised again with the publication of 
Kaye’s article in 1982.76 There, Kaye asserted that the civil all-
or-nothing decision rule was preferable to an expected value 
rule.77 The former system, he argued, minimizes the overall 
costs of error, whereas the latter enhances the social costs of 
error.78 The central development in the literature on probabilis-
tic remedies in tort law emerged in subsequent years with a 
string of publications that abandoned the ex post error minimi-
zation approach and turned instead to the issue of probabilistic 
liability from an ex ante deterrence perspective.79 These studies 
 
 75. John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise—The Uses 
of Doubt and Reason, 58 NW. U. L. REV. 750, 754–55 (1964). Coons defined four 
classes of cases in which courts should be allowed residual authority to issue 
compromise verdicts and to split the remedy between the parties, in deviation 
from the binary regime of full remedy awards: compromise of doubt; compro-
mise of policy; compromise of discretion; and compromise due to community 
interests. Id. at 754. The pertinent category for our purposes is compromise of 
doubt cases, in which Coons advocated remedy-splitting due to factual or legal 
doubts regarding legal liability. Id. at 755–60. In this context, he allowed only 
a narrow opening (which was widened by subsequent authors), restricting 
remedy-splitting to a 50%-50% ratio and to instances in which the court finds 
the parties’ versions equally likely. Id. at 778. 
Nonetheless, Coons’ pioneering approach was broader than later work by 
other authors, in that it forged a link between the allocation of the remedy and 
the level of certainty of liability not only on the factual front but also on the 
legal front. Only in 2001 did Michael Abramowicz revisit the possibility of al-
locating the remedy due to uncertainty on legal issues. See Michael 
Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 CALIF. L. 
REV. 231, 299–300 (2001). 
 76. David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Stand-
ard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. 
BAR FOUND. RES. J. 487. 
 77. Id. passim. 
 78. Id. at 491. 
 79. Examples of works making the claim that proportional liability would 
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showed that the shift to a regime of probabilistic remedies 
would advance deterrence objectives in instances of systematic 
failure in proving causation.80 
Contrary to the decades-long scholarly interest in the civil 
context, the issue of probabilistic decision making in the crimi-
nal sphere was essentially overlooked by researchers. The first 
sign of change came only in 2005, with the publication of a nov-
el article by Henrik Lando, in which he showed that for 
incarcerable offenses, graduating sanctions with the probability 
of guilt to reflect remaining doubt—even once the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt level of certainty has been attained—would 
 
promote deterrence include ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UN-
DER UNCERTAINTY 57–83 (2001); Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Resti-
tution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691 (1992); Glen O. Robin-
son, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. 
REV. 713 (1982); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure 
Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); 
and Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civ-
il Liability, 28 J.L. & ECON. 587 (1985). Counter-criticism can be found in 
Charles Nesson’s seminal article. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? 
On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 
(1985). 
 80. See Mario J. Rizzo & Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the 
Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (1980). The fail-
ures discussed in the literature can be divided into two central types of cases. 
The first category encompasses multiple causation cases, in which there is 
structural uncertainty as to whether, in the concrete circumstances, the dam-
age was caused as a result of the defendant’s behavior or due to exogenous 
background factors. A typical example is the factory that emits pollution 
known to produce 20 percent of the cancer morbidity in a given area, but it 
cannot be proven in each individual case that the factory’s polluting is the 
cause of illness. In such circumstances, holding the factory liable for 20 per-
cent of the damage for each plaintiff will ensure internalization of the damage 
caused due to the pollution, and will generate a set of optimal incentives for 
potential wrongdoers.  
The second class of cases relates to mass torts and comprises instances of 
uncertainty with regard to the wrongdoer’s identity: singling out from among 
a number of potential wrongdoers the actual wrongdoer who caused the plain-
tiff ’s injury. These are situations in which it is not possible to determine by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the particular defendant caused the dam-
age to the plaintiff, but it can be proven that he belongs to the group that in-
cludes the actual wrongdoer. In this context, too, the argument has been made 
that a shift to a Market Share Liability decision regime, under which each of 
the potential wrongdoers would bear a proportion of the damage relative to its 
share of the market (which reflects the probability of individual responsibility 
for the specific plaintiff ’s damage), would enable optimal deterrence and ame-
liorate the inherent failures of the all-or-nothing decision regime, where each 
and every wrongdoer is exempt from legal liability. See PORAT & STEIN, supra 
note 79, at 58. 
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promote deterrence objectives.81 The normative discussion in 
this Article follows in Lando’s path and expands it to the study 
of a full-fledged probabilistic regime.82 Unlike Lando’s focus on 
probabilistic sentencing and on the deterrence-based case for 
this practice, the analysis presented in this Article will exam-
ine the question of probabilistic decision making, both in the 
context of sentencing and in the context of the configuration of 
guilt, enhancing the spectrum of normative perspectives to in-
clude expressive, retributive, and political legitimacy consider-
ations. Moreover, the discussion will not be limited to challeng-
ing the uniformity of punishment in the epistemic space above 
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt threshold. Rather, it will chal-
lenge the threshold model in its entirety, addressing the possi-
bility of correcting systematic evidentiary failures by applying 
a probabilistic sentencing model in the epistemic expanse 
stretching below the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt point.  
 
 81. Lando, supra note 66, at 281. Another milestone was the 2009 Harel & 
Porat article, which applies the conjunction principle to cases in which multi-
ple unrelated charges are made against a defendant. Harel & Porat, supra 
note 53 passim. Under the current legal regime, if a defendant is accused of 
committing armed robbery and murder and, at the end of the day, the court 
concludes a 0.9 extent of certainty of his guilt in each of the crimes, then as-
suming that the reasonable doubt standard is quantified as a 0.95 extent of 
certainty, the defendant will be acquitted (0.9<0.95). Harel & Porat’s claim is 
that in the described scenario, the probability that the defendant did not 
commit either of the two offenses is 0.1*0.1=0.01. That is to say, the certainty 
that the defendant committed at least one of the two crimes (without us know-
ing which one) is 1-0.01=0.99 (0.99>0.95). Thus, according to Harel & Porat, 
the defendant should be convicted for one offense and receive, at least for one 
of the possibilities, the penalty for the lesser offense.  
In contrast to Harel & Porat, my analysis will not restrict itself to cases of 
conjunction or multiple charges, but will instead consider the implementation 
of probabilistic decisions in the general class of cases, including instances in 
which a defendant is accused of only one criminal offense. 
 82. Lando’s model serves as a good starting point for understanding the 
deterrence advantage associated with probabilistic sentencing. See Lando, su-
pra note 66 passim. However, the picture he presents is only partial, for the 
Lando model derives the deterrent effect of each unit of punishment solely 
from certainty of guilt, thereby entailing an additional, implicit conclusion: 
namely, that punishment should be imposed only at the highest measures of 
certainty. Id. at 277–78. Thus, while the Lando model justifies correlating 
punishment with probability of guilt, in focusing exclusively on the deterrent 
effect of certainty of guilt it constricts the epistemic space of conviction and 
punishment to only the highest levels of certainty. In this sense, and in com-
plete contradiction to its original objective, the Lando model may actually 
support the binary all-or-nothing regime.  
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II.  THE PROBABILISTIC MODEL FROM A DETERRENCE 
PERSPECTIVE   
A. THE DETERRENCE-BASED CASE FOR PROBABILISTIC 
SENTENCING 
Similar to the tort law context, where systematic under-
deterrence serves as a central argument for the implementa-
tion of market share liability (and other forms of probabilistic 
recovery), in the criminal law context as well, deterrence pre-
sents a strong case for probabilistic sentencing. Elsewhere,83 I 
have developed the economic model supporting the deterrence-
based argument for probabilistic sentencing, which is grounded 
upon three underpinnings: (1) the positive correlation between 
certainty of guilt and the deterrent effect of punishment (to 
which Lando pointed);84 (2) risk-seeking tendencies of potential 
offenders; and (3) the adverse effect of false acquittals on deter-
rence. Since deterrence is not the main focus of this current 
discussion, I will discuss only the general contours of these 
foundations of the deterrence-based case for probabilistic sen-
tencing, starting with the causal connection between the deter-
rent effect of punishment and the probability of guilt. 
In order for the criminal system to advance deterrence 
goals, criminal verdicts must reflect the factual truth. Random 
allocation of convictions and acquittals will not further deter-
rence, for the deterrent value of the criminal sanction is deter-
mined by whether it is imposed on the factually guilty or the 
innocent. As Lando pointed out, just as punishment of the fac-
tually innocent yields a lower deterrent effect than punishment 
of the factually guilty, punishment of defendants whose proba-
bility of guilt is low yields a lower deterrent effect than identi-
cal punishment imposed upon defendants whose certainty of 
guilt is high.85 Since deterrence effectiveness lessens with di-
minishing probability of guilt, correlating the magnitude of the 
sanction with the certitude of guilt will be expected to yield 
more deterrence per given social expenditure on punishment. A 
move to a sliding scale punishment regime—based on certainty 
 
 83. Talia Fisher, Constitutionalism and the Criminal Law: Rethinking 
Criminal Trial Bifurcation, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 811, 819–30 (2011). 
 84. See Lando, supra note 66, at 282.  
 85. Id. Lando discusses the differential deterrent value of imprisonment 
years, as a function of the defendant’s certainty of guilt. Id. at 278. 
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of guilt—would thus increase deterrence utility per sanctioning 
cost (per given level of social expenditure on punishment).86 
The positive link between the deterrent effect of punish-
ment and the certainty of the defendant’s guilt is imperative for 
understanding the deterrence advantage associated with prob-
abilistic sentencing. Lando’s argument for correlating punish-
ment severity with certainty of guilt is based exclusively upon 
this causal connection. In my opinion, however, the positive as-
sociation between the certainty of guilt and the deterrent effect 
of punishment does not offer a complete justification for such a 
sentencing regime (even from a deterrence perspective). In fact, 
contrary to Lando’s initial intention, this argument—when 
standing alone—may actually support the threshold model. 
For, deriving the deterrent effect of each unit of punishment 
(incarceration year) solely from certainty of guilt would seem to 
imply that punishment should be imposed only at the highest 
measures of certainty, thereby actually reinforcing the binary 
all-or-nothing regime, where conviction and punishment are lim-
ited to a narrow epistemic range of maximal levels of certainty.87  
 
 86. In simpler terms, punishing more severely those with a higher proba-
bility of guilt than those with a lower probability of guilt can be justified on 
the grounds that the greater the certainty of the defendant’s guilt, the lesser 
the concern of “wasting” punishment resources while obtaining a weaker de-
terrence effect, and vice versa. 
 87. In other words, the conclusions that arise from Lando’s model are 
double layered. The first layer, which Lando explicitly endorses, relates to the 
promotion of deterrence goals by deviating from the notion of fixed punish-
ment and correlating severity of punishment with measure of certainty, all 
things being equal. Lando, supra note 66, at 278. This layer of the model is a 
foundational component in the constitution of a probabilistic punishment re-
gime, but it constitutes only half the picture. The second layer implicit in the 
Lando model relates to the restriction of the ambit of punishment to the high-
est levels of certainty on the evidentiary spectrum. This layer can be derived 
from Lando’s model, since only at the highest levels of certainty regarding 
guilt is there a minimization of the probability of the imprisonment years be-
ing “wasted” on innocents, and since this is the only variable that Lando’s 
model considers as impacting deterrence effectiveness. Id. 
This second prong of the model is problematic, in my opinion, in that it ig-
nores additional variables that affect the deterrent utility of imprisonment 
years, such as the defendant’s attitude to risk and the deterrence cost of 
wrongful acquittals. Thus, Lando’s model assumes risk-neutrality on behalf of 
potential criminals. However, prospective offenders may exhibit risk-seeking 
tendencies in light of a diminishing marginal cost to each additional year of 
incarceration. Another explicit assumption underlying Lando’s model is that 
the different types of evidence evidence establishing the higher probability of 
guilt and evidence substantiating a lower probability of guilt are equally like-
ly to appear in court following the commission of the crime. Id. at 280. Howev-
er, in light of increasing marginal costs of evidence gathering, there is room to 
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This conclusion, implicitly arising out of the Lando model, 
regarding the deterrence advantage of restricting the ambit of 
punishment to the highest levels of certainty on the evidentiary 
spectrum, ought to be qualified. Two additional variables which 
impact the deterrent utility of imprisonment years should also 
be taken into account: the defendant’s attitude to risk and the 
deterrence cost of wrongful acquittals. When these two varia-
bles are taken together with the positive link between the de-
terrent effect of punishment and probability of guilt, to which 
Lando pointed, they collectively substantiate the deterrence-
based claim for probabilistic sentencing. Starting with attitude 
to risk, prospective offenders may exhibit risk-seeking tenden-
cies in light of a diminishing marginal cost to each additional 
year of incarceration.88 The reasons for the decrease in the 
marginal cost of additional imprisonment years are varied, and 
include the postulation that over time inmates grow accus-
tomed to the prison environment, making each year more toler-
able than the year preceding it.89 Under conditions of risk-
seeking tendencies and decreasing marginal cost of incarcera-
 
contest this assumption. Evidence establishing a higher probability of guilt is 
less likely to appear in court, and this may lead to a high incidence of false ac-
quittals under a regime that places maximal evidentiary requirements as a 
precondition for conviction. Incorporating risk-seeking tendencies and false 
acquittals into the equation facilitates the expansion of the epistemic space for 
conviction and the imposition of criminal punishment at lower levels of cer-
tainty (i.e., the lowering of the evidentiary threshold, perhaps even to levels 
falling below the reasonable doubt standard). 
 88. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 
76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 178 (1968) (claiming that offenders are deterred more by 
the certainty of conviction than by the severity of the sanction); William Spel-
man, The Severity of Intermediate Sanctions, 32 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 107, 
113 (1995) (surveying empirical evidence suggesting that offenders regard a 
five-year term as only twice to four times as severe as a one-year term and dis-
cussing some of the reasons for the decrease in the marginal cost (disutility) of 
prison years). 
 89. Additional considerations include the lower degree of certainty at-
tributed to the latter part of the prison term being served, due to the increas-
ing likelihood of pardon or early release on account of illness over time. See 
Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: 
Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 AM. L. 
ECON. REV. 276, 297 (1999) (discussing some of the reasons why defendants 
prefer uncertain sentences over uncertain probability of detection). For further 
discussion, see generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disu-
tility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 1 (1999) (asking whether deterrence is enhanced more by increas-
ing the length of imprisonment or raising the likelihood of imposing 
imprisonment and calculating the optimal combination of severity and proba-
bility of imprisonment). 
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tion years, the probability of conviction has a greater marginal 
deterrence effect than punishment severity90—so a low proba-
bility of conviction coupled with a proportionately higher sanc-
tion would yield less deterrence than a higher probability of 
conviction coupled with a proportionately lower sanction. In 
such situations, in which the disutility to the defendant in-
creases at a sub-proportional rate to the increase in length of 
imprisonment, punishment should not be limited to the highest 
evidentiary threshold (to maximal punishment at maximal lev-
els of certainty).  
The effect of the incidence of false acquittals may also justi-
fy, from a deterrence perspective, the expansion of the epistem-
ic space for conviction and punishment to sub maximal eviden-
tiary levels. In light of increasing marginal costs associated 
with the gathering of evidence,91 evidence establishing a higher 
probability of guilt is less likely to appear in court, and this 
may lead to a higher incidence of false acquittals under a re-
gime that places maximal evidentiary requirements as a pre-
condition for conviction. The force of this effect is a product of 
the distribution of wrongful convictions and acquittals at dif-
ferent epistemic levels and is likely to vary across different 
classes of cases. Either way, inserting the false acquittal varia-
ble into the equation allows us to identify situations in which 
optimal deterrence is achieved by lowering the standard of 
proof to enable conviction and punishment at sub maximal lev-
els of certainty of guilt (alongside maximal punishment at the 
higher levels of certainty). These situations can be regarded as 
the criminal counterpart to the abovementioned tort cases, in 
 
 90. See Michael K. Block & Robert C. Lind, An Economic Analysis of 
Crime Punishable by Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479, 483 (1975) (noting 
that an increase in the certainty of conviction has a greater deterrence capaci-
ty than an identical increase in punishment severity).  
 91. See, e.g., Talia Fisher, The Boundaries of Plea Bargaining: Negotiat-
ing the Standard of Proof, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943, 950–51 (2007) 
(“One can posit a situation where the task of proving the final X percent of the 
prosecution’s case requires a vast investment in resources on its part, such as 
the monetary cost of obtaining evidence from out-of-state witnesses, the emo-
tional price paid by child witnesses, or the cost of revealing evidence where the 
prosecution wants to preserve the cover of police agents. The prosecution may 
regard this evidence as crucial for proving its case ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, 
but find it unnecessary when a move to a lesser standard of proof has been 
made.”); Harel & Porat, supra note 53 at 291 (“It is typically much harder—
and more costly—to collect the tenth item of evidence than the ninth item, the 
eighth item, and so on.”).  
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which structural failures in proving causation justify a shift to 
a probabilistic-remedies regime.92  
The fundamental explanation for why shifting to a proba-
bilistic punishment regime would promote deterrence can thus 
be summed up as follows: due to the varying deterrence effect 
of incarceration, as a function of the variance in probability of 
guilt, there is cause to bind certainty of guilt to severity of pun-
ishment. This is the deterrence-based rationale for varying 
sanctions for the same behavior based on certainty of guilt. Yet 
it should not be inferred from this deterrence advantage that 
conviction and criminal sanctions should be limited to only the 
maximal levels of certainty of guilt. When risk-seeking tenden-
cies and wrongful acquittals are factored in, they may justify 
the lowering of the standard of proof necessary for conviction. 
The combined effect of the abovementioned variables—namely, 
the utility in terms of deterrence associated with varying the 
size of punishment with the probability of guilt, as well as the 
costs in deterrence associated with false acquittals and with 
the effects of risk-seeking tendencies—leads to the deterrence 
advantage of a probabilistic sentencing regime. These factors 
stand at the heart of the deterrence-based case which can be 
made for correlating severity of punishment with ex post cer-
tainty of guilt, while reducing the standard of proof for convic-
tion to sub-maximal levels. 
B. ERROR-COST QUALIFICATIONS  
In the previous Section I have argued that the uniformity 
of punishment in the epistemic space above the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt-standard and the lack of punishment at the 
levels of proof below that standard entail a deterrence cost, 
which could be avoided under a probabilistic-sentencing re-
gime. But as exemplified by Kaye’s argument, formulated 
against probabilistic remedies in the civil case context,93 the ex 
ante deterrence perspective is not the sole consideration, even 
from an efficiency perspective, and can be qualified by ex post 
error- cost criteria.94 In fact, in the criminal context of probabil-
istic sentencing, the issue of error costs may constitute an even 
greater constraint on deterrence-based considerations, as com-
pared to the civil scenario of probabilistic recoveries.  
 
 92. See supra Part I.E. 
 93. See Kaye, supra note 76. 
 94. See id. at 496–503.  
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The social costs of the two types of errors that occur in the 
framework of criminal proceedings—wrongful convictions and 
wrongful acquittals—are not commensurate.95 The social costs 
of wrongful conviction are regarded as significantly greater 
than those associated with false acquittal. Minimization of the 
aggregate social costs of error in criminal proceeding thus en-
tails lowering the incidence of false convictions, even by way of 
increasing the prevalence of false acquittals.96 The threshold 
model is compatible with this utilitarian calculus, for it allo-
cates the risk of error between the defense and prosecution in a 
way that promotes error in favor of defendants—which is con-
sidered less costly to society—at the expense of error in favor of 
the prosecution—which entails a more substantial social cost.97 
A probabilistic-decision regime would function in the reverse 
manner: the reduction in false acquittal errors would be 
 
 95. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, On the Degree of 
Confidence for Adverse Decisions, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 34 (1996). 
 96. Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 
279, 324 (1996) (the risks of error must be allocated between the defense and 
prosecution so as to reflect the disutility ratio between wrongful conviction 
and wrongful acquittal).  
For further discussion of the cost-minimization approach to evidence law, 
see Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judi-
cial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 408–17 (1973); Schauer & 
Zeckhauser, supra note 95, at 33–41. Assuming, for example, that the social 
cost of a false conviction is nine times greater than the cost of false acquittal, 
the evidentiary threshold for conviction should be set at a 90 percent certainty 
level. Such a standard of proof would be aimed at reducing the likelihood of 
erroneous conviction, by compromising on the certainty of the innocence of ac-
quitted defendants proportionate to the 9:1 disutility ratio between wrongful 
convictions and acquittals. See also David M. Appel, Note, Attorney Disbar-
ment Proceedings and the Standard of Proof, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 277 
(1995) (stating that the risk of error in the administration of criminal justice is 
borne predominantly by the prosecution). 
 97.  Stein, supra note 96; see also Schauer & Zeckhauser, supra note 95. 
Assuming that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof is set at a 90 
percent certainty level (probability of 0.9), the social harm inflicted by errone-
ously convicting an innocent defendant is considered to be about nine times 
costlier than the social costs of wrongful acquittal. For further discussion on 
the desirability of quantifying the reasonable doubt standard, see Henry A. 
Diamond, Note, Reasonable Doubt: To Define, or Not to Define, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1716 (1990) (arguing that jury instructions defining reasonable doubt 
should always be given); see also Peter Tillers & Jonathan Gottfried, United 
States v. Copeland: 369 F. Supp. 2d 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2005): A Collateral Attack 
on the Legal Maxim that Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Is Unquantifiable?, 
5 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 135, 140–41 (2006) (arguing that the usual reasons 
given for the unquantifiability of reasonable doubt are unsatisfactory, with the 
recent case of Copeland serving as a reminder that there are strong considera-
tions in favor of quantifying at least some standards of persuasion). 
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achieved by increasing the incidence of false conviction, with 
the likely general outcome being an increase in the aggregate 
social cost of error in judicial decisions. This increase in error 
might outweigh the marginal deterrence utility that would re-
sult from a move to a probabilistic regime. Therefore, even in 
situations in which the threshold regime is inefficient from an 
ex ante deterrence perspective, it may nonetheless lead to more 
efficient outcomes ex post.  
Incorporating the ex post error-costs into the equation 
may, indeed, constrict the probabilistic regime’s scope of opera-
tion. Nonetheless, in my opinion, the mere existence of this ef-
fect does not mandate a general sweeping preference of the 
threshold model. One reason is that the social cost of wrongful 
conviction is not exogenous and constant. Rather, it is a func-
tion of the severity of the accompanying punishment: the social 
cost of a wrongful conviction that results in a sentence of one 
day in prison is not equivalent to the cost of a wrongful convic-
tion resulting in life imprisonment.98 Under the probabilistic 
model, the cost of wrongful conviction at the lower epistemic 
levels is relatively low, for the punishment imposed is only par-
tial. This weakens the force of the ex post error-costs considera-
tion and must be taken into account when calculating the 
standard of proof for conviction.99 Moreover, even assuming 
that error-cost minimization is possible only under the thresh-
old model, there is still the matter of the accompanying price in 
deterrence. The deterrence costs of wrongful acquittals cannot 
be ignored when determining the desirable decision regime, 
and when they are extensive, there is no justification for a pri-
ori preference of the binary model. Shavell has made a similar 
assertion in the civil setting, claiming that “it is a mistake to 
take error-cost minimization as the social goal, and a mistake 
which explains such anomalous implications as the recom-
mended use of the more-probable-than-not threshold even 
 
 98. This runs contrary to the existing literature on the criminal standard 
of proof and the allocation of risk of error in criminal proceedings, which tends 
to ignore the differential social costs of wrongful convictions and implicitly as-
sumes a fixed social cost to such errors. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 96, at 
408–15. 
 99. It should be noted that under conditions of diminishing marginal cost 
of imprisonment years, upon which the deterrence argument rests, see supra 
Part II.A, a shorter sentence would indeed mitigate error costs, but it would 
mitigate the costs in a disproportionate manner to the number of years by 
which punishment is shortened. Put differently, the mitigation of error costs 
under the probabilistic model is qualified by the role of diminishing disutility 
of additional imprisonment years.  
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where it would result in defendants’ always escaping liability 
for harm done.”100 
III.  EXPRESSIVE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBABILISTIC 
MODEL   
The probabilistic model presents an interesting test case 
when viewed through the expressive prism. In what follows, I 
will contend with the ways in which expressive considerations 
emerge in the context of probabilistic decision making. I will 
start out by pointing to the hypothetical expressive-based criti-
cisms that can be leveled against probabilistic decision-making 
in the criminal arena. I will then turn to refute these objec-
tions, and show that the probabilistic model may actually fare 
better than the threshold model in fulfilling the expressive 
functions of criminal trials. 
Expressive theories of law are concerned with the expres-
sion of collective attitudes through legal action.101 The expres-
sive function of criminal law is particularly potent, for concur-
rent to promoting either deterrence or retribution, the criminal 
trial serves a communicative function.102 It constitutes a natu-
ral arena for clarification of, and reflection on, the social value 
scale.103 Labeling certain behaviors as criminal grants one mor-
 
 100. Shavell, supra note 79, at 605. 
 101. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of 
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1514–18 (2000). As a 
social practice, law has a significant expressive function, which can be under-
stood in two distinct senses. One is purely symbolic and non consequential. 
Many people support or object to law not for any consequential reasons (such 
as the law’s deterrent effect), but due to its symbolic content, namely, the dec-
laration it makes about the community’s morals and values. See Cass R. 
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022–
23 (1996). The other aspect of law’s expressivity is consequential and relates to 
its power to shape, change, and reinforce social norms. Law’s expressive func-
tion is manifested, in this sense, in its ability to influence normative behavior 
by making statements that create and sustain shared social norms, rather 
than controlling behavior directly. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, 
The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471 (1997).  
 102. Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton, Train Wrecks and Freeway Crashes: 
An Argument for Fairness and Against Self Representation in the Criminal 
Justice System, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 209 (2000). 
 103. For additional discussions of expressive theories of law, see Dan M. 
Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 414 (1999); Dan 
M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 
(1996); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 1649 (2000); Sunstein, supra note 101, at 2021. For criticism of the ex-
pressive approach, see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skep-
tical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1462 (2000). 
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al approach precedence over contradicting visions of justice.104 
Conviction conveys a message of moral opprobrium of the of-
fender and of the offender’s value scale.105 The severity of crim-
inal punishment, in turn, reflects the force of the moral repro-
bation. As stated by Dan M. Kahan, “What a community 
chooses to punish and how severely tells us what (or whom) it 
values and how much.”106 A probabilistic decision making re-
gime could potentially undermine each of these expressive 
functions of the criminal trial. In what follows, I will discuss 
the different ways in which probabilistic decision making may 
jeopardize the communicative functions of the criminal trial, 
with emphasis on three tenets: the expressive harm associated 
with the fragmentation of guilt under probabilistic conviction; 
the expressive harm associated with the relativity of punish-
ment under probabilistic sentencing; and the potential damage 
to the conceptualization of judicial decision making as a result 
of its exposure to probabilistic logic. 
A. THE EXPRESSIVE HARM OF CONVICTION RELATIVITY 
A probabilistic decision making regime would infuse the 
notion of guilt with relativity by effectively breaking the cate-
gory of criminal conviction into varying sub-types, segregated 
according to their evidentiary strength (conviction on guilt be-
yond all doubt, conviction on guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
conviction on guilt by clear and convincing evidence, and so 
forth). A possible objection to such fragmentation is that it 
would expose the existence of an evidentiary continuum at the 
base of the criminal verdict and could, therefore, undermine the 
labeling power of the criminal conviction.  
Under the threshold model, the institution of criminal con-
viction enjoys a monolithic status, due in part to the weighty 
evidentiary grounds that it requires. The underlying intuition 
 
 104. The expressive function of criminal proceedings is also reflected in 
procedural features. Thus, the criminal procedural structure reflects social 
justice concepts similarly to the substantive law that applies in the proceed-
ings. See Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused 
and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1140–42 (1982); 
Charles H. Koch, Jr., A Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus, 37 
HOUS. L. REV. 635, 636 (2000). 
 105. Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the 
Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 136 (2002) (“Behavior is crim-
inalized, in part, in an effort to express society’s moral condemnation of the 
behavior, as well as the values that the behavior symbolizes.”). 
 106. Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 615 (1998). 
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is that for the criminal conviction to carry out its denouncing 
and stigmatizing function, it must be founded on credible in-
formation regarding the offender’s guilt and must be distin-
guishable from all other decisions made by the State vis-à-vis 
its citizenry.107 Assigning a maximal standard of proof as a pre-
requisite for conviction protects the criminal conviction from di-
lution. It sustains the labeling power of conviction by perpetu-
ating the credibility of the information on which it rests and by 
preserving its unique nature.108 In light of the high probability 
of guilt in a conviction, the public is willing to subject the con-
victed offender to various social sanctions, while internalizing 
the costs that this entails. Under a probabilistic regime, in con-
trast, the evidentiary threshold for criminal conviction would 
be moderated and a dimension of variability would be intro-
duced into it. This could weaken the force of criminal conviction 
in conveying stigma and moral culpability. The greater extent 
of uncertainty with regard to the convicted offender’s factual 
guilt may produce negative expressive effects and lead to the di-
lution of the criminal conviction as a legal institution, resulting 
in public reluctance to impose social sanctions upon offenders. 
B. THE EXPRESSIVE HARM OF PUNISHMENT RELATIVITY 
In addition to relativity regarding the notion of guilt, a 
probabilistic regime would also infuse the function of criminal 
punishment with relativity, as the sentence imposed following 
conviction would reflect the epistemic certainty of guilt. There 
could be room to claim that the leniency of partial punishment, 
as a result of epistemic doubt, may fail to validate the social 
value scale. Thus, the realization of the expressive function of 
criminal punishment is contingent on the ability of the public 
to forge a link between severity of the punishment and the 
force of the moral repudiation of the offence and the offender.109 
Since, under the probabilistic model, punishment severity 
 
 107. Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and 
the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 808 (1997) (“[F]or 
punishment to be able to perform its blaming function, it must be distinguish-
able to the wrongdoer and the community at large from all of the other things 
that governments may do in the course of governing and all of the other bur-
dens citizens must bear as citizens. Thus, special procedures are necessary to 
make punishment more, rather than less, powerful.”); see also Lando, supra 
note 66, at 285.  
 108. See Streiker, supra note 107, at 809. 
 109. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 1743, 1749–50 (2005). 
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would be the product not only of the severity of the crime, but 
also of the probative weight of the incriminating evidence, an 
ambiguous expressive message may emanate from the court-
room. The reduction of the sanction and imposition of partial 
punishment, albeit due to evidentiary deficiencies, might be in-
terpreted by the public as stemming from the negligibility of 
the moral harm, thereby sabotaging the expressive goals of 
criminal punishment. Put differently, the accepted social mean-
ing of punishment places expressive constraints on the ability 
to tinker with punishment severity for the realization of exoge-
nous goals, including deterrence goals in the context of proba-
bilistic sentencing.110 
C. THE EXPRESSIVE HARM OF A PROBABILISTIC 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CRIMINAL FACT-FINDING 
Another possible expressive harm which may be attributed 
to probabilistic decision making relates to the adverse effect as-
sociated with exposure of the evidentiary continuum at the ba-
sis of the court’s findings. Such transparency may impair the 
expressive role of the criminal trial in preserving the proper 
conceptualization of judicial decision making. For the judiciary 
to fulfill its purpose in a liberal society, judicial decision-
making must be construed as premised upon factual truth.111 
While factual truth is categorical in nature (did or did not oc-
cur; valid or invalid),112 adjudicative fact-finding is inherently 
infused with uncertainty.113 Under the threshold model, when 
the court reconstructs the events underlying the trial, it con-
verts its intermediate certainty level into a categorical finding 
 
 110. See id. 
 111. David S. Kaplan & Lisa Dixon, Coerced Waiver and Coerced Consent, 
74 DENV. U. L. REV. 941, 953–54 (1997) (discussing the public policy goal of 
truth-seeking). 
 112. The claim that factual truth is categorical and unambiguous in nature 
can be contested, in light of the interdependency between fact and law and be-
tween fact and value. See HOCK LAI HO, A PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE LAW 7 
(2008). Philosophical skepticism also poses a challenge to the categorical na-
ture of fact-finding. See Laurence BonJour, Can Empirical Knowledge Have a 
Foundation?, 15 AM. PHIL. Q. 1, 1 (1978).  
 113. Stein, supra note 96, at 297–301 (claiming that adjudicative fact-
finding is bound to rest upon probabilities rather than certainty for a number 
of reasons: it does not always relate to the past but can instead consist of pre-
dictions of future occurrences; in the criminal trial context in particular, it 
deals not only with the empirical question of whether something happened, 
but also why something happened; and the fact that some facts are not easily 
severable from value judgments).  
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of conviction or acquittal.114 This requirement for conversion of 
adjudicative fact-finding into a categorical outcome can be justi-
fied on the background of the desire to preserve the potential of 
a link to the factual truth. Since the factual truth is categorical 
in nature, the verdict that allegedly manifests that truth must 
have a similar epistemic structure.  
Under a probabilistic regime, in contrast, such conversion 
would not take place. Judicial fact-finding decisions would sys-
tematically and a priori deviate from what occurred in reality, 
in all those situations where partial probability of (full) crimi-
nal responsibility would be translated into a determination of 
“partial criminal responsibility.”115 That is to say, the difference 
between the probabilistic regime and the threshold model can 
be conceptualized as the tension between a priori systematic 
error and ex post random error—or as the difference between 
situations in which the court makes a “half-error” in 100 per-
cent of the cases and those in which it completely errs in 50 
percent of the cases.116 Given this, a possible criticism of the 
probabilistic punishment regime could be that creating such a 
built-in discrepancy between the judicial decision and the fac-
tual truth would undermine the way in which judicial decision-
making is publicly portrayed. It would alter the perception of 
judicial decision-making from a process linked to factual truth 
to a probabilistic game premised on the allocation of risk.  
The described expressive harms to the public perception of 
judicial decision making are commonly presented in the litera-
ture from the slightly different perspective of legitimacy and 
public acceptability of the criminal legal system. Nesson117 and 
Tribe118 are the central authors to have linked public trust in 
 
 114. Bray, supra note 4, at 1307.  
 115. This is analogous to the blurring of the distinction between a determi-
nation that “the door is wide open in half of the cases” and the determination 
that “the door is half-open.” 
 116. John E. Coons, Compromise as Precise Justice, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 250, 
258 (1980). 
 117. Nesson, supra note 79, at 1358 (claiming that the successful projection 
of legal rules and the facilitation of public trust in the judicial system depend 
on a court’s ability to cast the verdict as a statement about the actual occur-
rence rather than as a statement about the evidence); see also Abramowicz, 
supra note 75, at 256; Scott E. Sundby, The Virtues of a Procedural View of 
Innocence—A Response to Professor Schwartz, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 161, 162–63 
(1989). 
 118. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the 
Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1376–77 (1971) (advising caution in us-
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the adjudication system to the binary threshold regime. Under 
their approach, courts’ legitimacy is contingent on the public’s 
perception of the criminal verdict as “statements about what 
actually happened.”119 Nesson and Tribe both maintain that the 
justification for the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt evidentiary 
threshold derives not only from its positive effect on the actual 
accuracy of judicial decisions, but also from the public trust 
embodied in maintaining an appearance of accuracy.120 From 
this standpoint, the probabilistic punishment model can be crit-
icized in that its admission of the existence of an evidentiary 
continuum would “transform the substantive message from one 
of morality . . . to one of crude risk calculation,” thereby un-
dermining the legitimacy of the criminal justice system in the 
eyes of the public.121 
D. THE EXPRESSIVE CASE FOR PROBABILISTIC CONVICTIONS  
Though at first glance expressive considerations seem to 
support the threshold model in light of the abovementioned ex-
pressive drawbacks associated with probabilistic decision mak-
ing (namely, dilution of the criminal conviction’s stigmatizing 
power, impairment of the communicative function of criminal 
punishment, and the adverse conceptualization of judicial deci-
sion-making), closer scrutiny reveals that a probabilistic deci-
sion-making model is actually better-equipped to fulfill the ex-
pressive functions of criminal trials. The incorporation of 
relativity into criminal conviction and the incorporation of var-
iability into criminal sentencing allow for the refinement and 
fortification of the criminal trial’s expressive message. I will 
turn to substantiate each of these claims, starting with the ex-
pressive advantages associated with a fragmented conception of 
guilt.  
The question of criminal guilt invokes the most complex 
and tangled categories dealt with in law, interweaving the de-
scriptive and the normative. Findings of guilt depict the alleged 
actions in a morally laden manner, and entail the weighing of a 
 
ing statistical evidence and claiming that mathematical information must be 
converted for the verdict to facilitate public trust in the judicial process). 
 119. Nesson, supra note 79, at 1358. 
 120. Lillquist, supra note 105, at 177 (“[T]heir writings suggest the possi-
bility that, irrespective of any costs and benefits from accurate and inaccurate 
verdicts, the way in which the current reasonable doubt instruction is imple-
mented can be explained . . . by the benefits that arise from promoting these 
other values.”).  
 121. Nesson, supra note 79, at 1362. 
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rich assortment of factual, normative, social, and emotional 
variables.122 The binary threshold model dictates that the mani-
fold aspects of criminal culpability be ultimately translated into 
the legal lexicon’s strict, one-dimensional terms of conviction or 
acquittal. It can be argued that such impoverished conceptual-
ization of the criminal trial’s outcome results in the loss of val-
uable information.123 A probabilistic regime, in contrast, would 
allow for a more nuanced and sophisticated answer to the ques-
tion of criminal responsibility. By creating multiple standards 
of criminal conviction, the probabilistic model would facilitate a 
more accurate reflection of the evidentiary gray areas that 
permeate criminal decision making, and would enable finer 
regulation of the accompanying social sanctions.124 The frag-
mentation of the criminal conviction into varying sub-types, re-
flective of differential probative values, would pave the way for 
transformation of the question of criminal responsibility from a 
qualitative question of “yes or no” to the quantitative “how 
much”.125 Put differently, while the expressive function of the 
 
 122. Take the classic example of murder. When the defendant is found 
guilty of murder, the finding does not simply record information about the oc-
currence. The verdict also passes a value judgment about what happened. See 
HO, supra note 112, at 9; see also Weigend, supra note 56, at 170 (discussing 
the notion of “the whole truth,” which encompasses the “myriad [of ] facts in-
cluding the psychological and biographical factors that might help explain why 
the offense was committed”). 
 123. For further discussion, see Fisher, supra note 91, at 988–89. 
 124. An infinite fragmentation of the criminal conviction into sub classes 
and categories may, indeed, impair its force in transmitting information re-
garding factual guilt. But as noted earlier, under the probabilistic punishment 
model, the conviction need not be broken down endlessly; four or five convic-
tion categories may suffice. See supra Parts I.A–D.  
 125. For a similar approach with respect to contractual liability, see 
HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 268–72 (2004) (chal-
lenging the conceptual binarism underlying the distinction between breach of 
contract and performance). It is true that in the criminal culpability context 
the abovementioned transformation is only partial, in the sense that it would 
allow for refinement of the judicial verdict and the concept of criminal liability 
only with regard to the underlying evidentiary dimension. The normative as-
pect of the question of criminal culpability remains binary and continues to be 
relegated to either full guilt or innocence. In other words, there is indeed a 
basic distinction between a verdict dealing with (full) criminal liability at par-
tial probability and a verdict that deals with “partial criminal liability.” The 
probabilistic model allows for verdicts of the first kind, which depend on an 
evidentiary base, but this would not suffice to establish the essential infra-
structure for a verdict of the second kind. However, the very conceptualization 
of criminal liability on a hierarchical scale, even if only in relation to the evi-
dentiary stratum, constitutes a first step toward opening a pluralistic and 
graduated discourse in relation to the normative question as well. 
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criminal conviction is indeed contingent on the ability to infer 
an informative decree from the conviction regarding the de-
fendant’s involvement in the crime and, accordingly, on the ex-
istence of some minimal standard of proof as a pre condition for 
conviction, this does not preclude a plurality of conviction cate-
gories based upon sub-maximal levels of proof. There is nothing 
sacred, natural, or pre-political about the existence of one mon-
olithic category of conviction.126 There is nothing in the expres-
sive role of the criminal conviction that mandates division of 
the world into two pure and mutually exclusive categories of 
guilt and innocence.127  
Moreover, when thinking about the expressive function of 
the criminal verdict, focus should not be placed solely on the 
expressive function of the criminal conviction. Rather, the ex-
pressive role played by the institution of the criminal acquittal 
must also be taken into account. Under the threshold model, 
acquittal covers a vast epistemic space, stretching from the 
end-point of full certainty regarding innocence to just below the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt threshold as to guilt. In such cir-
cumstances, criminal acquittal can serve only a limited expres-
sive function: it cannot clear a defendant’s name because it 
does not necessarily indicate sufficiently high levels of certainty 
regarding innocence.128 In fact, under the binary configuration 
of the threshold model, the defendant cannot avoid both convic-
tion and a stigmatizing acquittal, for the protection from con-
viction—in the form of a high evidentiary threshold—is itself 
the source of stigma that acquittal cannot remove.129 Under a 
probabilistic regime, on the other hand, the expressive trade-off 
is different. While the message of acquittal is fine-tuned due to 
the narrowing of the epistemic space it encompasses, this does 
not necessarily entail a higher prevalence of beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt convictions. The options of lower-level convic-
tions allow for moderated findings of guilt, matched with leni-
ent punishments. In sum, the expressive advantages associated 
with a fragmented conception of guilt include positive effects on 
 
 126. Bray, supra note 4, at 1324. 
 127. See Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative 
Massacre, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 582 (1995) (discussing the binary logic in-
herent to criminal law “with its insistence on dividing the world into mutually 
exclusive categories of people: legally, into guilty and innocent; sociologically, 
into blamers and blamed”). 
 128. Bray, supra note 4, at 1325. 
 129. Id. 
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the expressive role played by the institution of criminal  
acquittal.130  
E. THE EXPRESSIVE CASE FOR PROBABILISTIC SENTENCING 
There is also room to reconsider the hypothetical objec-
tions, portrayed above, regarding the expressive toll of sentenc-
ing variability—namely, the argument that probabilistic pun-
ishment would fail to validate the social value scale. Under a 
probabilistic punishment regime, the probative weight of the 
evidence would be expressed explicitly in the court’s actual de-
termination regarding type of conviction (and in the distinc-
tions between conviction on guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
convictions on guilt by clear and convincing evidence, and so 
forth). The transparency as to the extent of epistemic doubt, in-
corporated into the verdict, would allow the public to calculate 
the gravity of condemnation of the given criminal conduct un-
der the assumption of maximal certainty. 
More importantly, even under the threshold model, severi-
ty of punishment is determined on the basis of a multiplicity of 
variables. The defendant’s age, family status, or chances of re-
habilitation all affect sentence gravity. There is no reason to 
assume that the expressive function of punishment, or its ca-
pacity to reflect the full extent of social condemnation of the 
criminal activity, would be impaired by including certainty of 
guilt in the long list of considerations already incorporated into 
punishment severity.  
F. THE EXPRESSIVE CASE FOR THE PROBABILISTIC 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CRIMINAL FACT-FINDING 
The objection to probabilistic decision-making, rooted in 
the potential damage to public trust in the criminal justice sys-
tem, can also be contested. First, the conceptualization of public 
acceptability as an intrinsic normative end is, in itself, ques-
tionable. The system must merit acceptability; the matter of 
trust cannot be detached from the objective performance of the 
courts. It is the improvement in the court’s performance that is 
the ultimate end, rather than preservation of public trust per 
se. In terms of objective performance, a probabilistic decision 
making regime fares better than the threshold model in several 
respects: probabilistic decision making promotes deterrence, fa-
 
 130. For further discussion of the expressive costs associated with false ac-
quittal, see Lillquist, supra note 105. 
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cilitates a fine-tuned expressive message as to guilt and pun-
ishment, and allows for a fairer ex post imposition of punish-
ments among offenders (as will be elaborated below).131 Second, 
even if one accepts the aspiration to public acceptability as an 
intrinsic goal of the criminal trial, it is doubtful that this goal 
can be attained by denying the risks of error inherent to all ju-
dicial decisions.132 There is no empirical basis to the contention 
that creating trust in the criminal justice system is contingent 
on the transmission of a misleading message of certainty as to 
the guilt of every person convicted in court.133 In fact, quite the 
opposite may be true: the dissonance between public awareness 
of wrongful convictions and the façade of certainty of guilt 
could fatally undermine the system’s public legitimacy. As 
Abramowicz has asserted, “Even if legal institutions have de-
veloped methods of fooling the public because such fooling in 
individual cases increases the prestige of the courts, the gen-
eral practice of trying to fool the public may decrease prestige 
even more.”134 Indeed, making the probabilistic foundation of 
the judicial decision transparent may foster public trust in the 
judicial system far more effectively than camouflaging the risks 
of error. 
IV.  RETRIBUTIVE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBABILISTIC 
MODEL   
Unlike consequentialist theories of punishment—which 
justify criminal punishment in light of its instrumental role in 
pursuing desirable social ends, such as deterrence or communi-
cation of social repudiation—retributivism holds the criminal 
 
 131. See infra Parts IV.A–D.  
 132. See Talia Fisher & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, The Confessional Penalty, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV 871, 908 (2008). 
 133. See Daniel Shaviro, Statistical Probability Evidence and the Appear-
ance of Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530, 544 (1989) (“Perhaps the best way to 
create a perception of verdict accuracy is to create the reality of verdict accu-
racy. Perceptions created at the expense of the reality may be unstable, espe-
cially over the long term, because not everyone is likely to be fooled. Some 
people may know that the system as a general matter is pursuing perception 
at the expense of reality. Other people may simply know or believe that ver-
dicts are inaccurate in particular cases; more such cases will create more such 
people. The question then becomes one of determining how widely the disillu-
sioning knowledge about verdict error will spread over time. If society learns 
that the legal system pursues perception at the expense of reality, it may expe-
rience greater disillusionment than if it merely discovered some inaccuracy.”). 
 134. Abramowicz, supra note 75, at 239 n.104. 
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punishment of the culpable to be an intrinsic good.135 At the 
center of retributivism stands the premise that criminal pun-
ishment, like any other social institution, must be valid from a 
moral standpoint and its ramifications for public welfare can-
not constitute a justifying rationale.136 Under the retributivist 
approach, the sole justification for criminal punishment is the 
connection between the sanction and the criminal act commit-
ted.137 The conjectural retributivist line of criticism, which can 
be formulated against the probabilistic model, is that such a 
decision-making regime would generate moral harm that can-
not be outweighed by its social outcomes, including any deter-
rence utility. The potential moral harm posed by probabilistic 
decision making can be described as having two central mani-
festations. First, by allowing the imposition of criminal pun-
ishment in the epistemic space below the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt threshold, the probabilistic regime deviates from retribu-
tivist principles, which prohibit inflicting punishment absent 
moral certainty regarding guilt. Second, by incorporating epis-
temic uncertainty into the magnitude of the sanction, the prob-
abilistic model departs from the retributivist principle of pro-
 
 135. See Joel Feinberg, The Classic Debate, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 727, 
727–29 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 2000) (claiming that con-
sequentialists look forward with regard to criminal punishment and focus on 
the instrumentality of the criminal sanction in advancing desired social out-
comes, whereas retributivists take a retrospective view of punishment); see 
also Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” 
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 862 (2002) (arguing that retributivism fo-
cuses on the appropriate and the just as opposed to the desirable or effective in 
terms of various teleological goals). 
 136. Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Concep-
tion of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 216 (“[ I ]nstitutions should 
produce morally correct decisions regardless of ultimate effects on socie-
ty . . . . This conception of justice punishes not in service of some greater socie-
tal goal but in proportion to the criminal’s moral blameworthiness and the 
harm caused by his offense.”). 
 137. R. A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 4 (1986) (describing retributiv-
ist theories as rooted in “the idea that punishment is justified as merited ret-
ribution for a past offence”). In Kant’s words, “Punishment by a court . . . can 
never be inflicted merely as a means to promote some other good for the crim-
inal himself or for civil society. It must always be inflicted upon him only be-
cause he has committed a crime.” IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS 105 (Mary Gregor ed., trans., 1996). Only a link between the criminal 
act and the act of punishment can ensure that the defendant’s human dignity 
is preserved and prevent his transformation into an instrument for realizing 
social goals, “For a human being can never be treated merely as a means to 
the purposes of another or be put among the objects of rights to things: his in-
nate personality protects him from this, even though he can be condemned to 
lose his civil personality.” Id. 
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portionality, which mandates formulaic sanctions correlating 
solely with moral guilt. I will hereby address each of these hypo-
thetical retributive objections to probabilistic decision making. 
A. PUNISHMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF MORAL CERTAINTY 
REGARDING GUILT  
A principal element in retributivist thought is that the sole 
justification for punishment is the existence of guilt,138 and that 
punishing in the absence of the highest humanly possible level 
of certainty as to guilt is morally illegitimate.139 Retributivists 
would thus criticize the probabilistic model for eroding the evi-
dence threshold and thereby weakening the moral legitimacy of 
inflicting criminal punishment. Imposing punishment based on 
evidence with a probative weight falling below the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard (i.e., below the standard of moral 
certainty) results in the defendant’s objectification, causing 
moral harm that is incommensurable with deterrence utili-
ties.140 
 
 138. A. M. Quinton, On Punishment, 14 ANALYSIS 133, 134–38 (1954) (dis-
cussing the ontological connection between punishment and a past offense and 
arguing that punishment of the innocent is impossible because if the person is 
not guilty, then what is imposed upon him cannot be deemed punishment). 
Some retributivists posit that this refers to moral guilt; others contend that it 
refers to legal guilt. For further discussion of the distinction between “moral-
istic” and “legalistic” retributivism, see Christopher, supra note 135, at 881. 
 139. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (“Retributivism is the view that pun-
ishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who receive it. A retribu-
tivist punishes because, and only because, the offender deserves it.”).  
The scope of this Article precludes an extensive discussion of the complex 
matter of defining moral certainty, although I will address further the link be-
tween moral certainty and the standard of proof in criminal proceedings. For 
the time being, I will suffice with the following definition of moral certainty: 
“[T]he form of certainty that any person is capable of achieving from an under-
standing of the nature of things, applying reason and thought to the testimony 
of others, along with personal observation and experience.” Steve Sheppard, 
The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof 
Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1165, 
1177 (2003). 
 140. See Lillquist, supra note 105, at 140 (describing the incommensurabil-
ity principle). In other words, from the retributivist viewpoint, the deterrence 
approach turns things upside down in extolling certainty in punishing the 
guilty when what should in fact stand, absolutely, at the center of every theory 
of punishment is certainty of not punishing the innocent. See Erik Lillquist, 
The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings About Apprendi, 82 N.C. 
L. REV. 621, 695 (2004) [hereinafter Lillquist, The Puzzling Return]. 
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B. DEVIATION FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
The existence of guilt, albeit a mandatory requirement, is 
not sufficient to legitimize criminal punishment from a retribu-
tivist standpoint. In addition, the severity of the punishment 
must be reasonable and proportionate to the severity of the 
crime committed.141 This principle of proportionality, which 
prescribes the offender’s just desert, was described by Kant as 
follows:  
[W]hatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the peo-
ple, that you inflict upon yourself. If you insult him, you insult your-
self; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself; if you strike him, 
you strike yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself. But only the law 
of retribution (ius talionis) . . . can specify definitely the quality and 
the quantity of punishment; all other principles are fluctuating and 
unsuited for a sentence of pure and strict justice because extraneous 
considerations are mixed into them.142 
Hegel explained the principle of proportionality on the fact 
that both the crime and act of punishment constitute coer-
cion.143 The latter act of coercion—infliction of punishment—has 
the power to eliminate the coercive element of the earlier ac-
tion—the criminal act. This can occur only if there is corre-
spondence between the second and first acts of coercion.144  
 
 141. A distinction should be made in this context between retributivist ap-
proaches that advocate mandatory punishment and those that view the exist-
ence of guilt as a justification for punishment but do not mandate its imposi-
tion. Kant and Hegel believed that the existence of guilt creates an obligation 
on the part of society and the sovereign to inflict criminal punishment. See 
G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 100 (Allen W. Wood 
ed., H.B. Nisbet, trans., 1991); KANT, supra note 137. According to Kant, “the 
law of punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who crawls 
through the windings of eudaemonism in order to discover something that re-
leases the criminal from punishment . . . .” KANT, supra note 137. In contrast, 
there are thinkers who contend that the existence of guilt creates the authori-
ty, and not the duty, to punish. E.g., Michael T. Cahill, Retributivist Justice in 
the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 826–28, 828 n.36 (2007).  
 142. KANT, supra note 137, at 105–06. For an expansion on this principle, 
see Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 
93 VA. L. REV. 1197, 1204–05 (2007); Christopher, supra note 135, at 860 n.79; 
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 509, 530–32 (1987). There is a distinction in this context between nega-
tive retribution approaches, which set only the uppermost standard of pun-
ishment, and positive retribution approaches, which also set a minimal stand-
ard of punishment.  
 143. See HEGEL, supra note 141, §§ 94–95. 
 144. For further discussion of Hegel’s articulation of the lex talionis princi-
ple, see Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor ’s Dilemma: Bargains and Pun-
ishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 127 (2003); see also Markus Dirk, Rediscov-
ering Hegel’s Theory of Crime and Punishment, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1577, 1581–
83 (1994) (discussing Hegel’s view of crime and punishment). 
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The proportionality principle mandates the imposition of 
formulaic sanctions suited to the moral gravity of the underly-
ing crime.145 The principle gives rise to another possible retri-
butivist objection to the probabilistic regime, namely, its devia-
tion from the principles of just desert due to epistemic 
uncertainty. Indeed, retributivists would strongly reject the 
merging of the penal and epistemic dimensions of criminal pro-
ceedings and the accompanying breach of proportionality be-
tween crime and punishment. In cases where the level of proof 
against the defendant does not reach the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt threshold, a probabilistic decision-making regime would 
allow the epistemic gulf to be bridged through penal means, by 
eroding—in retributivist terms—the criminal sanction to a lev-
el below what is prescribed by the proportionality principle.146 
Even in cases in which the defendant’s guilt has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, probabilistic punishment would 
constitute a deviation from the just desert requirement, due to 
the penal variability that it entails. Penal variability—as a 
function of the probative weight of the evidence in any given 
case—collides head-on with the principle of proportionality, 
which prescribes the imposition of a sanction that reflects only 
the gravity of the crime, upon moral certainty of guilt.147 
C. THE RETRIBUTIVE CRITIQUE RECONSIDERED  
Admittedly, from an internal-retributive viewpoint, the at-
tempt to justify the probabilistic model is likely to appear un-
convincing. In my opinion, however, the retributivist theory 
cannot serve as a standard for assessing the normative desira-
bility of any given decision regime, including the probabilistic 
decision-making model. The reason is that the retributivist 
theory focuses on the individual case and does not address the 
general systemic level.148 Retributivists are concurrently com-
 
 145. For an extensive discussion of this principle, see Thomas E. Hill, Kant 
on Wrongdoing, Desert and Punishment, 18 LAW & PHIL. 407, 428–37 (1999); 
see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 202 (1997) (discussing the substantive proportionality of pun-
ishment in context of completed versus attempted crimes). 
 146. This type of harm can be understood as a sort of mirror-image of the 
harm deriving from punishment in the absence of moral certainty, discussed 
above. Under the retributivist approach, just as moral certainty of guilt cannot 
be waived as a precondition for criminal punishment, so is non-proportional 
punishment due to epistemic doubts intolerable. See Lillquist, The Puzzling 
Return, supra note 140, at 623–24.  
 147. See Luna, supra note 136, at 223. 
 148. See HEGEL, supra note 141, § 99. 
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mitted to two fundamental principles: punishing the guilty and 
not punishing the innocent.149 Deviation from either one of the-
se outcomes is considered a departure from the principles of 
just desert.150  
But due to the focus on the individual case in retributivist 
thought, these two mandates are construed in absolute terms, 
without addressing the question of which takes priority. In-
deed, retributivism takes no stance with regard to the trade-off 
between wrongful conviction and wrongful acquittal over the 
general cross-section of cases. It is, in this sense, a utopian the-
ory, disregarding the difficult day-to-day reality of unavoidable 
errors in legal fact-finding, where decreasing the incidence of 
wrongful convictions comes at the cost of increasing the overall 
rate of wrongful acquittals.151 In light of this lack of a systemic 
outlook and the absolutist conception of the principles of non-
punishment of the innocent and punishment of the guilty—
with no inquiry into the comparability between the two—many 
contend that the retributivist theories cannot, in fact, justify 
any type of decision regime, the present threshold model in-
cluded. Reiman and van den Haag, for example, assert that the 
retributivist theories cannot justify the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt threshold, as it is inconsistent with the retributivist 
commitment to punishing the guilty: “Should we try to convict 
fewer innocents and risk letting more of the guilty escape, or 
try to convict more of the guilty, and, unavoidably, more of the 
innocent? Retributivism (although not necessarily retributiv-
ists) is mute on how high standards of proof ought to be . . . .”152 
Similarly, Michael Moore asserts that the retributivist ap-
proach no less justifies the relatively lower preponderance-of-
evidence standard in the criminal sphere than it does the 
heightened beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. In his opin-
ion, absent any a priori commitment to the appropriate system-
ic ratio between wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals, 
“[t]he retributivist might adopt a principle of symmetry here—
the guilty going unpunished is exactly the same magnitude of 
evil as the innocent being punished—and design his institu-
 
 149. Christopher, supra note 135, at 848. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Luna, supra note 136, at 219 (noting that retributivism in practice 
results in “factually innocent individuals, as well as legally justified or excused 
defendants, . . . be[ing] subject to undeserved punishment”). 
 152. Jeffrey Reiman & Ernest van den Haag, On the Common Saying That 
It Is Better That Ten Guilty Persons Escape Than That One Innocent Suffer: 
Pro and Con, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Spring 1990, at 226, 242–43. 
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tions accordingly.”153 At the very most, then, retributivist theo-
ries embody pure ethics, while they are unable to lay an im-
plementable normative groundwork upon which to evaluate dif-
ferent decision regimes. In neglecting systematic thinking, 
retributive theories cannot serve as a source of valid criticism 
against probabilistic decision making.154 
 
 153. MOORE, supra note 145, at 157 n.11. 
 154. Moreover, as a practical matter, epistemic mistakes in the administra-
tion of criminal justice are unavoidable: “[B]ecause punishment is adminis-
tered by the state rather than by god . . . it is inevitable that the practice of 
punishment will suffer from (at least) each of the following three deficiencies: 
It will be tremendously expensive, subject to grave error, and susceptible to 
enormous abuse.” Douglas N. Husak, Why Punish the Deserving?, 26 NOÛS 
447, 450 (1992). It is therefore impossible to ensure that both mandates—
punishing the guilty and not punishing the innocent—are simultaneously up-
held.  
Retributivists are thus susceptible to the same criticism they direct at 
consequentialist approaches. For so long as they do not out-and-out reject 
criminal punishment, retributivists can be accused of subjecting the innocent 
to punishment to further the goal of punishing the guilty and thus of turning 
them into a means for furthering external goals: “The retributivist remains 
‘willing to trade the welfare of the innocents who are punished by mistake for 
the greater good of the punishment of the guilty’ and thus, it would seem 
committed to sacrificing—‘using’—the mistakenly convicted for the benefit of 
society in general.” David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA 
L. REV. 1623, 1632–33 (1992) [hereinafter Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retribu-
tivism]. The retributivist does this “by appealing to the inevitability of mistak-
en convictions,” for this reason “retributivism itself can be accused of using 
convicted offenders, and thus stripped of its cloak of Kantian respectability.” 
Id. at 1632.  
The common retributivist response to these claims is that an a priori sys-
tematic error is quite different from an ex-post random error. Retributivist 
theorists contend that adopting a criminal penal system, with all of its accom-
panying dangers, creates the risk of unjust desert for an unidentified public, 
but that it is qualitatively different from exposing specific defendants to a de-
liberate risk. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Retributivism and the Inadvertent 
Punishment of the Innocent, 2 LAW & PHIL. 233, 235–36 (1983). These theo-
rists base the moral legitimacy of the act of criminal punishment also on the 
doctrine of double effect propounded by Aquinas, under which moral norms 
are absolutely binding only in cases of intentional outcomes. THOMAS 
AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS 227–28 (William P. Baumgarth & 
Richard J. Regan eds., 1988). An action that breeds concurrent positive and 
negative results will be considered illegitimate from a moral perspective if the 
negative result is an intentional outcome—whether as an end or as a means to 
other ends. See id. The action will be allowed, in contrast, if the negative by-
product—even though anticipated in advance—is not intended as a final end 
or an intermediate means. See David Dolinko, Retributivism, Consequential-
ism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment, 16 LAW & PHIL. 507, 512 
(1997); Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retributivism, 27 ISR. L. REV. 15, 20 
(1993).  
The retributivist rationale for the institution of criminal punishment is, 
therefore, that the difficult outcome of wrongful convictions, despite being 
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D. THE MIXED RETRIBUTIVIST-UTILITARIAN PERSPECTIVE  
The following discussion will address a slightly different 
type of critique which can be formulated against the probabilis-
tic model—one that incorporates retributivist elements, while 
offering the systemic perspective neglected in purely retributiv-
ist theories. According to the potential line of criticism, the spe-
cific trade-off between false convictions and deterrence, ex-
pected in the framework of a probabilistic regime, is morally 
flawed. This type of criticism can be described as a mixed re-
tributivist-utilitarian critique in that it rests on retributive 
foundations yet recognizes the possibility, in principle, of creat-
ing a moral balance between wrongful conviction and other so-
cial values.  
Many attempts have been made to reconcile the conse-
quentialist and retributivist theories of punishment, with 
Hart’s punishment theory at their center.155 Hart’s justification 
for criminal punishment is two-layered. The first layer, termed 
the “general justifying aim,” relates to the justification of the 
 
known and anticipated in advance, is not intentional—not as a final end nor 
as a means for punishing the guilty. In other words, under the retributivist 
paradigm, the moral legitimacy of criminal proceedings and the act of pun-
ishment is determined according to the efforts taken to prevent wrongful con-
viction and not the outcome of those efforts. In this sense, the wrongful convic-
tion of a given defendant under the existing criminal proceedings model, 
whereby he receives the maximum punishment of ten years in prison, is not 
comparable to the parallel scenario likely to arise under a probabilistic pun-
ishment model: the conviction of a number of innocents by a lower standard of 
evidence and the infliction of one year of imprisonment on each. See Albert W. 
Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 714 
(1981); Christopher, supra note 135, at 901.  
There is a clear difference between the two scenarios even if we assume 
that their outcomes are identical from a substantive perspective. This differ-
ence is rooted in the fact that the first wrongful conviction is not systematic to 
the criminal proceeding or one of its intentional outcomes. In contrast, the 
wrongful convictions in the second scenario are a built-in component of the 
proceeding and unjust from the perspective of the decision regime itself. Here 
the question arises as to whether the probabilistic punishment model also 
meets the standards set in the double effect doctrine, and there may be con-
flicting views in this regard. For an analogous discussion in the context of re-
ducing the criminal standard of evidence, see Christopher, supra note 135, at 
913–15. For additional criticism of the application of the double effect doctrine, 
see Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, supra at 1633–36. 
 155. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW 8–13 (reprt. 1988); see also Hamish Stewart, Legality and 
Morality in H.L.A. Hart’s Theory of Criminal Law, 52 SMU L. REV. 201, 203 
(1999) (discussing Hart’s theory of liability and criminal punishment, and de-
scribing it as an “alternative to viewing criminal punishment as purely conse-
quentialist or purely utilitarian”).  
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general practice of punishment and rests on consequentialist 
grounds.156 It addresses the useful outcomes of criminal pun-
ishment in terms of deterrence. The second layer—the “princi-
ples of distribution”—relates to the question of who should be 
punished and how punishment should be meted out in socie-
ty.157 The answer to this second question, according to Hart, is 
grounded on retributivist precepts: only those who have com-
mitted a crime should be punished.158 Hart offered a similar 
mixed retributive-utilitarian approach with regard to the sever-
ity of the criminal sanction. While still insisting that the pun-
ishment should be consistent with principles of just desert, he 
also acknowledged the possibility of deterrence goals constrain-
ing the level of punishment.159  
Despite Hart’s incorporation of deterrence elements into 
the theory and justification of criminal punishment, the proba-
bilistic punishment model may still not align with it.160 From 
the Hartian perspective, the difficulty with a probabilistic 
trade-off that renders more convictions but less severe penal-
ties on average is not rooted in the reduction of the sanction’s 
severity per se; for, as Hart himself acknowledges, deterrence 
goals can constitute an upper limit to punishment.161 Rather, 
what is problematic is the possibility of imposing criminal pun-
ishment on defendants whose guilt has not been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The potential for criminal punishment ab-
sent moral guilt clashes with the distributional component of 
Hart’s justification and, thereby, forms the crux of the conjec-
tural resistance to a probabilistic decision-making model. 
In my opinion, however, considerations of punishment dis-
tribution actually support the probabilistic model, rather than 
undermine it. Under the threshold model, minimal differences 
in the probative weight of the incriminating evidence result in 
dramatic discrepancies in the outcomes of the judicial process. 
Whereas when the probability of guilt exceeds the reasonable 
doubt threshold even slightly, full-blown punishment is im-
 
 156. HART, supra note 155, at 8–11. 
 157. Id. at 11–13. 
 158. Stewart, supra note 155. For a further discussion of Hart’s distinction 
between the “general justifying aim” of punishment and its distribution, see 
Christopher, supra note 135, at 868–69. 
 159. See HART, supra note 155, at 88. 
 160. This is a central point of criticism made by retributivists against 
Hart’s approach. See, e.g., Igor Primoratz, Mixed Rationales, in THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 559, 560 (Christopher Berry Gray ed., 1999). 
 161. See HART, supra note 155, at 88. 
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posed; when the probability of criminal culpability falls slightly 
below the evidentiary threshold, the defendant is acquitted and 
completely exempt from criminal punishment. It can be argued 
that such dramatic divergences in outcome due to only minimal 
epistemic disparities violate the principles of justice and fair-
ness. In other words, the binary dichotomy of the threshold 
model may be contested in light of its effect on the distribution 
of punishment across the class of defendants. The distributive 
outcome of this all-or-nothing regime is that many of the factu-
ally guilty are released from all responsibility and go totally 
unpunished, while a minority of defendants incurs a high level 
of criminal punishment, in excess of what they would have re-
ceived were the punishment resources distributed across a wid-
er group of defendants. Although all of these potential defend-
ants are exposed ex ante to the same punishment expectancy, 
ignoring the ex post distributive outcomes of the threshold 
model may nonetheless be problematic. The distributive trade-
off under the probabilistic model could be more appropriate in 
this context: turning the dichotomy into a continuum and pun-
ishing a greater number of the factually guilty while reducing 
sanction severity would reduce the penal disparities between 
cases of similar epistemic infrastructure. Probabilistic sentenc-
ing lessens the ex post outcome distortions among cases exhib-
iting minimal epistemic divergences, leading to a more just and 
equal distribution of punishment across the general class of  
defendants.162  
 
 162. Another possible caveat of the hypothetical retributive and Hartian 
critiques of probabilistic decision making is that when considering the moral 
trade-off, it is important to weigh not only the rights of the accused but also 
those of the victims of crime. Both the classic retributivist approach and the 
distribution component of Hart’s theory can be criticized for disregarding the 
actual and potential victim of the crime. See Christopher, Deterring Retributiv-
ism, supra note 135, at 874 (claiming that “though deterrence theories may be 
unjust in justifying the intentional punishment of innocents, retributivism is 
unjust in exposing the innocent general public (innocent future crime victims) 
to a greater risk of victimization”).  
Similarly to how the deterrence approach uses the defendant to realize ex-
ternal social goals, classical retributivism makes instrumental use of the pre-
sent and future victims of crime, in its protection of defendants as subjects. Id. 
at 951 (“On the one hand, incorporating the interests of the victim into a de-
termination of the deserved punishment of the victimizer seems incompatible 
with retributivism. On the other hand, using one set of persons (crime victims) 
as mere means in order to treat another set of persons (offenders) as ends in 
themselves, if not incompatible with retributivism, renders retributivism sub-
ject to one of its principal criticisms of consequentialism.” (citation omitted)). 
Prominent contemporary retributivist scholars, such as George Fletcher, have 
even proposed expanding the conception of retribution so as to also include 
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V.  THE POLITICAL LEGITIMACY OF THE PROBABILISTIC 
MODEL   
Irrespective of the deterrence, expressive, and distributive 
considerations supporting the probabilistic model, this decision-
making regime does pose a challenge to the liberal state model. 
As a distinct part of the law wielded by state organs, criminal 
law is the strongest expression of the state-law link. Criminal 
punishment is a potent manifestation of state coercion and pos-
es the most substantial challenge to the justification of state 
action: “If punishment can be justified, so can other, lesser, 
forms of coercive state action. If it cannot, what’s the point of 
legitimizing, say, taxation?”163 Questions of political legitimacy 
arise in each of the criminal law arenas, from the very defini-
tion of the criminal offense (substantive criminal law), to its 
implementation in concrete cases (procedural criminal law), to 
its enforcement through the imposition of criminal punishment 
(enforcement).164  
As a general rule, the liberal state is committed to ideologi-
cal neutrality toward the different conceptions of good and 
therefore must refrain from moral denunciation, which is per-
ceived as an infringement on individual autonomy.165 Yet the 
State’s act of defining the criminal offense is aimed entirely at 
giving certain conceptions of good precedence over competing 
anti-ethical notions, and at imposing these moral stances on 
the public at large. Criminal law thus constitutes a significant 
exception to the liberal principle of non intervention.166 The 
 
victims. GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN 
CRIMINAL TRIALS 202–05 (1995). 
 163. Markus Dirk Dubber, A Political Theory of Criminal Law: Autonomy 
and the Legitimacy of State Punishment 1 (Mar. 15, 2004) (unpublished man-
uscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=529522. 
 164. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Criminal Trial and the Legitimation of 
Punishment, in THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TRUTH AND DUE PROCESS 85, 85 (Antony 
Duff et al. eds., 2004).  
 165. Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Morals Af-
ter All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1351 (1991). 
 166. See Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 310 (2004) (“Any theory of state punishment in a lib-
eral democracy must grapple with the problem of political legitimacy.”); see 
also R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY 35 (2001) (“A 
normative theory of punishment must include a conception of crime as that 
which is to be punished. Such a conception of crime presupposes a conception 
of the criminal law—of its proper aims and content, of its claims on the citizen. 
Such a conception of the criminal law presupposes a conception of the state—
of its proper role and functions, of its relation to its citizens. Such a conception 
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same holds true for the procedural and enforcement arenas. By 
punishing a person, the State not only strips him of property 
and liberty or otherwise inflicts on him pain and humiliation, it 
also brands him as morally culpable. In so doing, the State acts 
in a way that exceeds its ordinary capacity and authority in a 
liberal democracy: “Punishment . . . is prima facie illegitimate; 
in punishing its constituents, the state harms the very people it 
is supposed to protect, by interfering with the very rights it 
claims to guarantee, in the name of guaranteeing them.”167  
The extraordinary functions that the state performs in the 
various arenas of criminal law raise a host of political legitima-
cy issues. Against this background of exceptional state interfer-
ence in individual autonomy, and in light of the concern that 
this unique capacity will be exploited for wrongful concentra-
tion of coercive state power, the traditional liberal view advo-
cates restricting substantive criminal law to the mala per se.168 
On the procedural front as well, the heightened procedural 
safeguards extended to defendants and the requirement that 
conviction be based on a high likelihood of guilt are considered 
imperative for authorizing such extraordinary state action and 
for preventing the establishment of guilt by association. They 
are intended to circumscribe the State’s right to exceed its or-
dinary role and ascribe moral culpability to its citizens, while 
at the same time ensuring limited use of this coercive state 
power.169 The threshold model, and its pivotal requirement of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, are, thus, a matter of political 
morality and serve as one of the main limitations on state pow-
er in modern systems.170 The probabilistic model, in contrast, 
enhances the coercive capacity of the state by expanding the 
 
of the state must also include a conception of society and of the relation be-
tween state and society.”). 
 167. Dubber, supra note 163, at 1; see also Stephen P. Garvey, Lifting the 
Veil on Punishment, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 443, 443 (2004) (“When the state 
punishes a person, it treats him as it ordinarily should not. It takes away his 
property, throws him in prison, or otherwise interferes with his liberty.”).  
 168. For further discussion of this claim, see Bierschbach & Stein, supra 
note 142, at 1254–55. 
 169. See George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative 
Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 
888–90 (1968) (explaining that the heightened burden of persuasion in crimi-
nal trials is attributable to the need to justify the use of criminal sanctions as 
a means of moral condemnation). 
 170. See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 13 (2005); Claire 
Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 
382 (2000) (claiming that the presumption of innocence is a presumption in 
favor of individual liberty).  
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range of situations in which individuals are exposed to moral 
denunciation to include even instances in which guilt is not 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This extension of the space 
of coercive state action, it can be asserted, both violates the lib-
eral principle of nonintervention and lacks political legitimacy.  
While the challenge posed by probabilistic decision making 
to the liberal state model is, indeed, a strong case against its 
implementation, there is room to qualify it. First, this objection 
refers to only one component of the probabilistic model—that 
relating to the category of cases in the epistemic range beneath 
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt threshold. It is the possibility of 
conviction and punishment based on lower certainty of guilt 
that poses the threat of intensifying state coercion. The liberal 
model does not inherently conflict with the second component 
of the probabilistic model, which refers to the epistemic space 
above the reasonable doubt threshold, and which prescribes 
variability of punishment as a function of the weight of remain-
ing doubt. Put differently, the political legitimacy perspective 
can, at most, restrict the applicability of the probabilistic model 
to the epistemic space above the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
threshold, but it does not preclude the possibility of infusing 
the criminal arena with probabilistic logic per se.  
Second, even with respect to the epistemic range stretching 
beneath the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt threshold, a case can be 
made for the probabilistic model. As explained above, under the 
probabilistic model the expansion of the epistemic space of con-
viction to sub maximal evidentiary levels is rooted in the effort 
to remedy a higher than optimal level of false acquittals due to 
the existence of systematic evidentiary obstacles.171 Such situa-
tions of systematic under-deterrence constitute the criminal 
counterpart to probabilistic remedies in tort law, where struc-
tural failures in proving causation justified a shift to a proba-
bilistic remedies regime.172 There may be room to claim that in-
sisting on the insurmountable beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
threshold under such circumstances—as prescribed by the 
threshold regime—effectively precludes the execution of the 
substantive social choice to prohibit the underlying criminal ac-
tivity. Thus, the very inclusion of a particular activity in the 
list of criminal offenses expresses the social choice to deter in-
dividuals from engaging in that activity. Yet heightened evi-
dentiary requirements in the face of systematic proof barriers 
 
 171. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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effectively prevent the conviction of individuals who engage in 
the underlying forbidden activity. This leads to a failure to real-
ize the social choice with respect to that activity and to a de fac-
to deviation from the predetermined processes for resolving po-
litical disputes in society. In such cases, it is the very departure 
from the maximal evidentiary requirements that would enable 
the effective execution of the substantive social choice. The 
probabilistic model therefore validates the accepted social pro-
cesses for assembling the collective value scale from the con-
flicting visions of the good life.173 This line of thought better 
aligns with the Rawlsian understanding of autonomy as con-
tingent upon society’s ability to predetermine the processes by 
which to choose between conflicting social values.174 
Lastly, the political legitimacy criticism can be qualified in 
yet another respect, which relates to the victims of crime and to 
the state-victim link (existing parallel to the state-defendant 
axis). There may be room to claim that the liberal state’s duty 
toward victims of crime, and the need to balance victims’ rights 
with those of defendants, can serve as possible justifications for 
expanded use of the state’s coercive power, as would occur un-
der a probabilistic regime. This interpretation of the liberal 
model is naturally debatable and raises a host of possible objec-
tions,175 a deliberation that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Suffice it to say for present purposes that upholding victims’ 
rights, if we assume them to be consistent with the underpin-
nings of the liberal tradition, can constitute yet another ra-
tionale for the expanded space of state coercion under the prob-
abilistic decision-making model.  
  CONCLUSION   
The threshold model—with its on-off configuration of guilt 
and all-or-nothing sentencing—has been established to the 
point of being considered an inevitable reality. This Article at-
tempted to expand the horizons of legal imagination by bring-
ing to light the alternative of probabilistic decision-making in 
the criminal arena. As demonstrated, the criminal justice sys-
 
 173. A similar measure (but in the opposite direction)  was taken by 
Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 142, at 1254. 
 174. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 98 (expanded ed. 2005). 
 175. For further discussion of the claim that victims’ rights conflict with 
the premises of the liberal model, see Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the 
Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111 (2001). 
 2012] CONVICTION WITHOUT CONVICTION 885 
 
tem is overrun by legal practices that reflect probabilistic deci-
sion-making logic. Central doctrines in the criminal law 
world—such as the residual doubt doctrine, the recidivist pre-
mium, and even the jury trial penalty—have paved the way for 
incorporating certainty of guilt into the severity of punishment 
meted out. Moreover, as this Article shows, the probabilistic 
model is supported by deterrence and expressive considera-
tions. It is also compatible with fairness and justice considera-
tions, as it leads to a fairer ex post distribution of criminal pun-
ishment. The possible drawbacks of the probabilistic regime, 
whether based on ex post error-cost considerations or on politi-
cal legitimacy grounds, fail to collapse the model. At the very 
most, these claims serve to circumscribe the scope of applica-
tion of a probabilistic decision-making regime in the criminal 
sphere. Notwithstanding this, however, the question of the re-
gime’s parameters is secondary in a reality in which the 
threshold model is construed as the only possible option. The 
ideal of binary decision making at trial was questioned already 
by Hume, when he made the following claim: 
[T]ho’ abstract reasoning, and the general maxims of philosophy and 
law establish this position, that property, and right, and obligation 
admit not of degrees, yet in our common and negligent way of think-
ing, we find great difficulty to entertain that opinion, and do even se-
cretly embrace the contrary principle. . . . An action must either be 
perform’d or not. The necessity there is of choosing one side in these 
dilemmas, and the impossibility there often is of finding any just me-
dium, oblige us, when we reflect on the matter, to acknowledge, that 
all . . . obligations are entire. But on the other hand, when we consid-
er the origins of . . . obligation and find that they depend on public 
utility, and sometimes on the propensities of the imagination, which 
are seldom entire on any side; we are naturally inclin’d to imagine, 
that these moral relations admit of an insensible gradation . . . . Half 
rights and obligations, which seem so natural in common life, are per-
fect absurdities in their tribunal; for which reason they are often 
oblig’d to take half arguments for whole ones, in order to terminate 
the affair one way or other.176 
In this Article, I have sought to present a decision making 
model that does not mandate that we “take half arguments for 
whole ones” and that recognizes the possibility of gradation in 
the criminal verdict and sentencing. It is my hope that this will 
serve as a preliminary opening for continued dialogue on the 
subject of the place of probabilistic decision making in the crim-
inal arena and for a reevaluation of the threshold paradigm. 
 
 176. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 530–31 (1888), quoted 
in Joseph Jaconelli, Solomonic Justice and the Common Law, 12 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 480, 481 (1992). 
